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"My thesis is simple: with notice secured by recordation, freedom of con-
tract should control."
- Richard Epstein'
"[Private] desires are social constructs."
- Cass Sunstein'
"It would be a heart-warming scene, a triumph of private attention to what
is essentially private self-government . . . if only all businessmen and all their
lawyers would be reasonable."
- Karl Llewellyn
3
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, legal scholars have clashed over the issue of
whether private law questions ought to be analyzed in a paradigm of consent or
in a paradigm of coercion. Illustrative of the controversy have been the debates
on the fundamental nature of the law of land servitudes. Economic and tradi-
tional scholars have sided with the dominant judicial view that servitude law is
consensual; critical legal scholars, on the other hand, have argued that servitude
law is primarily or largely coercive.4 Contestants on both sides have advanced
their arguments in a matter largely abstracted from empirical study.'
Simultaneously, a revolution in American housing patterns has created a
real-world model that can be employed to test the contentions on each side of
the coercion/consent debate. The real-world model is the Property Owners As-
sociation (POA), an entity that during this period has emerged from the legal
and social periphery to become a central feature of modern society.
Legally, a POA is but a private organization-one that manages and regu-
lates a condominium or other common-interest housing subdivision.6 Practically,
1. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL L. REv. 1353, 1358
(1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Notice].
2. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1170 (1986).
3. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960).
4. Among articles contending that servitudes and POA membership are consensual are Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, Cities]; Epstein, Cove-
nants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Covenants]; Epstein, Notice,
supra note 1; Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978) [hereinafter
Reichman, Judicial Supervision]; Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976) [hereinafter Reiehman, Residential].
Among articles contending that servitudes and POA membership are coercive, or that the coercion/consent
dichotomy is meaningless are Alexander, Freedom. Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
883 (1988) and Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982). For an
article questioning the effectiveness of consent in many circumstances, see Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of
Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989
WIs. L. REV. 1, 56-62.
5. A notable exception is Professor Winokur. See generally Winokur, supra note 4.
6. As used in this article, a Property Owners Association (POA) is "an organization regulating and/or
providing services for a land subdivision, which organization is created by covenants running with the land and
whose membership consists of holders of units in the subdivison." R. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS 3 (1989). The term includes entities that govern condominiums and similarly interdependent subdi-
visions of the "town house," and "cluster home" varieties. It also includes traditional "homeowners' associations"
regulating subdivisions of single family detached dwellings and entities governing commercial subdivisions, such as
the business condominium association. However, the term excludes housing cooperatives and similar associations
that stand in a tenurial relationship with their members.
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it constitutes a form of private government whose rules, financial practices, and
other decisions can be a powerful force for good or for ill in the lives of its
members. As of 1988, those members included nearly thirty million
Americans.7
POA decisionmaking, like decisionmaking by other private entities, is sub-
ject to judicial review. Under the standards that now prevail, the decisions of a
POA must represent good faith efforts to further the purposes of its subdivi-
sion,8 and if promulgated after a complaining owner has purchased a unit, they
must constitute reasonable means of accomplishing such purposes.' POA deci-
sions must be consistent with governing documents of superior force, and they
must comply, as to both purpose served and means employed, with public
policy.10
Most of the reported cases on POA decisionmaking focus on the reasona-
bleness criterion."' When these cases are subjected not merely to traditional
7. As of 1988, 29,640,000 people lived in 130,000 "community associations," a term that excludes nonresi-
dential POAs and includes housing cooperatives. COMMUNITY ASs'NS INST., COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS FAcroOK
9 (1988) [hereinafter FAcTBOOK]. Cooperatives represent only about five percent of the total. Id.
8. The purpose of the subdivision is determined primarily from its nature, the circumstances of its develop-
ment, and recitals in its governing documents. The most important document is the declaration or master deed
(often called the "declaration of conditions, covenants, and restrictions" or "CC&Rs"), a collection of servitudes
and conditions invariably filed by the developer in the local recording office. The declaration sets forth the associa-
tion's powers over the subdivision and describes all or some of the initial use restrictions. The recording of the
declaration, coupled with the developer's simultaneous or subsequent sale of units in the subdivision, has the effect
of imposing upon those units various easements and restrictive and affirmative covenants. Many if not most decla-
rations have the additional effect of limiting the unit purchasers' estates in some way; in other words, they create
future interests, usually executory interests. See R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 55-60, 587-631. ,
The courts have expressly or impliedly validated a number of subdivision purposes, most relating to property
protection and preservation. See, e.g., Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 58 Cal. App. 3d 506, 512, 130 Cal. Rptr.
32, 35 (1976) (enhancing the value of each home); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 8, 449 P.2d 361,
362 (1969) (protecting the present and future values of the properties); Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (maintaining "a community of congenial residents who are financially responsible and thus
protect the value of the apartments"); Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga. 100, 101, 137 S.E.2d 288, 289 (1964) (main-
taining high quality of subdivision); Drabinsky v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 239 N.Y. 321, 329-30, 146 N.E. 614, 616-17
(1925) (maintaining the essential character of the inclosure as a private residential park or colony); Lakemoor
Community Club, Inc. v. Swanson, 24 Wash. App. 10, 14, 600 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1979) (ensuring that a subdivi-
sion remains "a quiet, self-contained residential community").
Secondary purposes furthering primary goals also are common. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223,
228, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (1974) (eliminating noise associated with children so as to create a quiet and peaceful
neighborhood); Anthony, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (providing "well-kept clubhouse, recrea-
tional area and swimming pool" and "opportunities for playground activities and other forms of family and com-
munity recreation"); Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 133 III. App. 3d 327, 329, 478 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1985)
(protecting and preserving "the distinctive qualities, amenities and characteristics of the area so that it would at
all times be regarded as a residential community of outstanding excellence"); Lakemoor, 24 Wash. App. at 16-17,
600 P.2d at 1026 (enforcing restrictions to ensure development has road system closed to through traffic).
9. One distinguish reasonableness review of the kind discussed here from the question of whether a POA
regulation violates the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation. See, e.g., Seagate Condominium Ass'n v.
Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244
(1983).
10. R. NATEISON, supra note 6, at 123-53 (association rules), 171-73 (other POA decisions).
II. Despite intermittent scholarly and judicial attempts to pour content into the vessel of reasonableness
review, there has not yet been systematic normative or economic study. There are two student notes focusing on
reasonableness: Note, Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64
CHn.-KENT L. REv. 653 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Use Restrictions] and Note, Judicial Review of Condominium
Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. RE v. 647 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Condominimum Rulemaking]. Also relevant to the
subject is Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REv. 472 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
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doctrinal analysis, but to economic study in the light of recent empirical re-
search,12 they offer a promising method for examining judicial response to con-
sent and coercion in private law.
In the course of this Article, I reach several conclusions. One is that the
empirical studies and the fact patterns of the cases reveal that POA decision-
making contains elements of both coercion and consent. The precise mixture of
the two varies according to temporal, market, cultural, and other factors. The
courts enforce POA rules to which there has been genuine consent. When there
is no genuine consent, they review those rules under a standard of "reasonable-
ness." In this context, "reasonableness" means that the courts enforce POA de-
cisions only when they can be integrated into a hypothetical bargain, a substi-
tute for consent. Under the reasonableness standard, it is required that a POA
decision be not merely efficient or utilitarian, but Pareto-superior.13 This Article
demonstrates that the judicial standard of Pareto superiority is not unique to
the law of Property Owners Associations. It is utilized whenever one person or
group exercises coercive control over the lives or property of others.14
For a decision to be Pareto-superior, it must be efficient, but not all effi-
cient decisions are Pareto-superior. When a decision is efficient but not Pareto-
superior, compensation can make it so. This Article explores the ways by which
courts measure efficiency and compensation when there is no consent. It also
examines judicial response when a POA decision cannot be integrated into a
hypothetical bargain because it is difficult or impossible to measure compensa-
tion. The latter situation arises when a POA threatens an interest that is central
to a unit owner's personhood.15
II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Functions of the Property Owners Association
The POA may serve any of three overlapping, but separately identifiable,
functions-the mediation, preservation, and community enhancement functions.
Residential Associations]. A 'few articles written by legal scholars have discussed the reasonableness criterion in
the course of treating larger subjects: Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4; Natelson, Keeping Faith: Fiduciary Obliga-
tions in Property Owners Associations, II VT. L. REv. 421 (1986) [hereinafter Natelson, Fiduciary]; Reichman,
Judicial Supervision, supra note 4; and Reichman, Residential; supra note 4.
12. The empirical studies are S. BARTON & C. SILVERMAN. COMMON INTEREST HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIA-
TIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY (Cal. Dep't Real Estate 1987) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA STUDY]; D. BENNEWITZ,
CONDOMINIUM PROFILE: COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY FINDINGS AND RESULTS ON CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS AND
THEIR OPERATIONS (Community Ass'ns Inst. 1986) [hereinafter CAI STUDY]; S. WILLIAMSON & R. ADAMS, DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN CONDOMINIUMS (Human Resources Management Center, College of Business Admin., Univ.
N. Fla. 1987) [hereinafter FLORIDA STUDY]; R. Burby, Environmental Amenities and New Community Govern-
ance: Results of a Nationwide Study (Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Univ. N.C. 1974) (paper prepared
for presentation at 5th Annual Conference of the Environmental Design Research Association (May 30 - June 1,
1974)); V. Walker, Striking the Balance: The Development of Social Control in Condominium Associations (Doc-
toral Dissertation, Nw. Univ. 1984).
13. Outcome A is said to be Pareto-superior to Outcome B if and only if at least one person is better off
under A and nobody is worse off. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (3d ed. 1986). See infra notes 135-
38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part IV. D.
15. See infra Part VII.
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The mediation function consists of protecting the interests of individual mem-
bers in their capacity as holders of individually held parcels of real estate-that
is, in their capacity as unit owners.' Through its mediation activities, the POA
protects unit holders from harmful externalities arising from other units.,7
The primary legal tools of the mediation function are restrictive covenants,
especially those controlling land use and architectural style.'8 The POA reduces
the transaction costs' 9 of covenant administration by serving as a central en-
forcement agency with accumulated experience and expertise. It also minimizes
free rider problems by financing administration through mandatory assessments
on members and provides parliamentary procedures by which covenants may be
refined and modified without unanimous landowner approval. Thus, the POA
reduces or eliminates multiparty negotiation and the concomitant dangers of
wasted time, administrative expense, and holdouts.
The preservation function is the maintenance of existing common ameni-
ties and services. The word "preservation" emphasizes the conservative nature
of this function. Preservation includes capital replacement, but does not other-
wise encompass acquiring new property or constructing new amenities, nor does
it include profit-making activities or other kinds of community promotion.
Before 1960, the typical association was limited to the mediation function,
with perhaps a very few preservation activities. Most associations established in
the last few decades, however, maintain a range of amenities. Examples are
swimming pools, clubhouses, tennis courts, playgrounds, parks, exercise facili-
ties, lakes, marinas, golf courses, roads, water and sewer lines, and even restau-
rants.20 Most newer associations also offer a variety of services, sometimes re-
lated to the amenities, sometimes not. Examples are landscaping and other
property maintenance, social functions, waste removal, community newsletters,
cable television, bus transportation, child daycdre, nursery schools, and security
16. As used herein, the term "unit" means an individually occupied lot or air space block. Unit often is
defined to include also an appurtenant interest in common elements, i.e., co-owned common property. R. NATEL-
SON, supra note 6, at 6.
17. See, e.g., R. Burby, supra note 12, at I 1 (activities such as architectural review and maintenance).
18. Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 269-70. In more elaborate declarations, affirmative covenants
and affirmative easements assist the mediation function. The most common affirmative covenants serving this
purpose are those requiring unit owners or the association to undertake maintenance duties on particular lots and
those requiring the members to pay periodic assessments in order to finance covenant administration and enforce-
ment. Id. at 270-71, 273. The most common affirmative easements serving the mediation function are those grant-
ing agents of the POA access to particular units in order to prevent externalities. See, e.g., River Terrace Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Lewis, 33 Ohio App. 3d 52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986) (access to unit to spray for cockroaches).
19. On the subject of the POA as a transaction cost avoider, see R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 59-60;
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681, 717 (1973) [hereinafter Ellickson, Alternatives]; and Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 292.
Transaction costs are the costs involved in ordering economic activity through voluntary exchange. R. POSNER,
supra, at 367.
20. For surveys of common amenities, see FACTrOOK, supra note 7, at 9; R. Burby, supra note 12, at 11-12;
CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 8. The California Study, a survey of 579 POAs in that state, yielded typical
results. Following is a list of amenities and the percentage of associations earing for each: Open space or lawns -
92%; park or playground - 84%; meeting place - 72%; parking lot or structure - 62%; swimming facility -
58%; roads - 43%; water or sewer lines - 42%; other recreational facility - 21%. Id. at 3, 8. Interestingly
enough, POAs of middle size rather than large subdivisions are the most lavishly endowed with amenities. CAI
STUDY, supra note 12, at 50 (the statement to the contrary, id. at 12, does not reflect the statistics provided). See
also Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 255 (discussing amenities).
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systems.2' The legal mechanisms for carrying out these activities consist princi-
pally of easements and affirmative covenants, in conjunction with powers
granted to nonprofit organizations by statutory and common law.22
The third discrete function is the community enhancement function. A
POA performs the community enhancement function when it acquires addi-
tional real estate for parking, upgrades its heating system beyond replacement
needs, lobbies for a zoning change that would increase the desirability of its
property, or adopts an administrative rule designed to improve, rather than
merely maintain, unit values. Affirmative covenants and statutory and common
law association powers provide the legal basis for activities comprising the com-
munity enhancement function.
I have adopted the distinction between the preservation and community
enhancement functions because it reflects a duality in judicial and public per-
ceptions. Unit owners seem to expect preservation activity, but not community
enhancement activity of the kind one would expect from a municipality or a
business enterprise.23 Courts adjudicating in this area have sought to reflect
such public understanding.24 They have, therefore, severely limited an associa-
tion's power to engage in community enhancement activities.2 5
21. See CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 8; FACTBOOK, supra note 7, at 10; R. Burby, supra note 12,
at 11. POA security systems internalize the value of the other amenities by preventing outsiders from using them.
Ellickson, Alternatives, supra note 19, at 712.
22. Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 267-75, 279. Most commentators, including Dean Reichman,
emphasize the servitude basis of association powers. See infra text accompanying note 43. However, some associa-
tion services arguably do not touch and concern the land. Reliance on statutory and common law association and
corporate powers eliminates doubts as to the POA's authority to, for example, publish a community newsletter.
Easements allow association access to the property to be maintained and unit owner access to the amenities to
be enjoyed. Affirmative covenants impose various obligations on the association, and they establish the assessment
mechanism. The assessment mechanism avoids free rider problems or, more precisely, avoids the transaction costs
of determining who used what and how much each person should be paid for each service:
My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the communist regime, when a large group
of workers marched along the shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique interest of this example
is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them.
... IT]he concept of shirking is, therefore, an indirect way of expressing that there is a cost in discovering
prices for relative contributions.
Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & EcON. 1, 8-9 (1983).
23. On unit purchasers' conservative, risk-adverse expectancies, see infra note 157. On the primacy of eco-
nomic self-interest in condominium purchasers over group and social factors, see V. Walker, supra note 12, at 19,
28.
24. See, e.g., Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971): "Daily in this state thousands of citizens are investing millions of dollars in condominium property. [The
applicable statute] and the Articles or Declarations of Condominiums provided for thereunder ought to be con-
strued strictly to assure these investors that what the buyer sees the buyer gets."
25. Judicial opinions sometimes recite governmental-type purposes set forth in POA covenants, such as
"promoting the general welfare of the residents," see, e.g., Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) ("for the health, comfort, safety, and general welfare of the unit owners and occupants of said property"),
but I see little evidence that courts take such language seriously. Not all courts will grant such purposes even
nominal recognition. See, e.g., Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d
178 (1980).
A series of Florida cases reflects the prevalent judicial attitude. Relying in part on a statute prohibiting
amendments to the declaration that materially alter a condominium unit without unanimous owner approval, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 718.110(4) (West 1988), the Florida courts have prohibited community enhancement activities in
several cases. See Downey v. Jungle Den Villas Recreation Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(prohibiting acquisition of real estate and construction of new swimming pool); Rothenberg v. Plymouth No. 5
Condominium Ass'n, 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibiting establishment of bus service); Is-
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Through its preservation and community enhancement activities the associ-
ation offers its members the same advantage available to the shareholders of a
business firm: replacement of high contract costs with lower agency costs. Al-
though similar amenities and services are available on the open market, the
association enables the members to avoid the costs of the market price mecha-
nism. These costs, as Professor Cheung has observed, 6 consist primarily of the
expense of discovering what the relevant prices are. Without an association, the
members would have to investigate each of the large number of amenities and
services available in modern society, learn enough about each amenity and ser-
vice to be able to understand its pricing, appraise different services provided by
the same supplier (as when a single maintenance person both mows lawns and
repairs plumbing), and assess the respective contributions of each participant in
a single project. By purchasing a unit in a subdivision governed by a Property
Owners Association, the owner receives the entire panoply of services in ex-
change for one periodic monthly assessment.
B. Context of POA Decisionmaking and Judicial Review
The scope of the association's mediation, preservation, and community en-
hancement functions is delineated initially in a declaration or master deed pre-
pared by legal counsel for the subdivision developer and recorded prior to the
sale of the first unit. The declaration is a collection of servitudes and conditions
governing the subdivision's property law regime. The structure of the POA itself
and the procedures under which it will exercise its functions are set forth in
articles of association or articles of incorporation and in bylaws, also prepared
by the developer's attorney. In addition to the procedural content typical of
corporate bylaws, POA bylaws often contain further use restrictions, and these
bylaws may be recorded along with the declaration.
Day-to-day subdivision governance is entrusted to a board of directors,
which may be called by that name or by some analogous title.2" Most POA
decisionmaking is effectuated through that board, in the form of either adminis-
trative rules or ad hoe resolutions. In the course of its duties the board may
establish rules for clubhouse use, limit the number of pets in a unit, set the level
of financial assessments imposed on each unit, approve or reject an application
for a building permit, or vote to construct a new tennis court. The general mem-
bership also has inherent rulemaking power through its ability to change the
bylaws, articles, and declaration.
The extent of the decisionmaking power differs according to the nature of
the particular subdivision. In subdivisions of individually owned single-family
homes, POA authority may be quite limited. In subdivisions that are highly
interdependent legally (such as condominiums) or architecturally (such as
landia Condominium Ass'n v. Vermut, 501 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibiting alteration of origi-
nal exterior color scheme); Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n v. Levy, 489 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(prohibiting acquisition of real estate). See also Zaid v. Island House Condominium Ass'n, 170 N.J. Super. 206,
406 A.2d 196 (Ch. Div. 1979) (prohibiting POA brokerage activities).
26. Cheung, supra note 22, at 6-8.
27. E.g., "board of managers."
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apartment buildings), POA regulatory schemes are intense and the decision-
making power quite significant.28
C. Previous Efforts to Define the Standards for Judicial Review
The POA decisionmaking power is subject to abuse. A POA may promul-
gate a decision that is unfairly discriminatory or may adopt a resolution without
rational foundation, adequate investigation, or notice to the members.2 9 The po-
tential for abuse and the relative lack of decided cases in the area have induced
courts and commentators to cast in various directions for precedents appropriate
to review of POA decisionmaking.
For the most part, these courts and commentators have proceeded by scan-
ning the legal landscape for situations similar to POA decisionmaking and for
entities similar to POAs in the hope of identifying some substantial body of
precedent that can be incorporated into POA law en masse. In the process,
individual courts and commentators have resorted to public law and constitu-
tional standards,30 judicial review of the developer's exercise of reserved pow-
28. Various empirical data support the intuitive view that the intensity of POA power increases as unit
interdependence increases. Thus, CAI STUDY, supra note 12, which surveyed condominiums only, reported higher
assessment levels for high rises and medium rises than for single family homes, townhouses, or garden apartments.
Id. at 17, 66. The sample of single-family home condominiums was too small to be statistically significant, but in
other subdivisions there was a strong correlation between architectural interdependence and intensity of regula-
tion. For example, POAs governing high and midrise buildings were more likely to charge one-time rental fees, id.
at 34, and only 16.4% of high and medium rises (the smallest of any group) had no age, right of first refusal, or
pet restrictions.
Following is the percentage of each architectural group with surveyed regulations. These figures were ob-
tained by manipulation of tables, id. at 67.
Rights of first refusal
High and medium rises. .................... 45.4%
Garden apartments ............................... 31.7%
Townhouses .................... ............... 33.5%
Pet restrictions
High and medium rises ......................... .......... 58.0%
Garden apartments ........................ ......... 54.8%
Townhouses .................................... 39.0%
Age or child restrictions
High and medium rises ........................... ....... 21.0%
Garden apartments ..................... .......... 23.0%
Townhouses ......... ............... ...... .............. 9.9%
Move-in fee
High and medium rises ....... ..................... 28.6%
Garden apartments .................................... 14.4%
Townhouses ......................................... 9.9%
29. See. e.g., Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 274-75 (fearing possibility of abuse by discriminatory
regulations and discriminatory application of facially fair regulations); Note, Condominium Rulemaking, supra
note 1I, at 648 (same); Note, Residential Associations, supra note 11. at 473-78 (fearing "illiberal" associations
that do not respect societal norms of civil liberties).
30. Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv.
297 (1986); Note, Residential Associations, supra note 11.
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ers, 32 trust law, 32  and the laws of business corporations 3  and housing
cooperatives. 34
Resort to public law standards has not been notably successful. Precedents
applicable to governmental decisionmaking do not apply very well to POAs, and
not merely, as one commentator has suggested, because submission to a POA is
"perfectly voluntary," while submission to government is imperfectly so.35
Courts probably should not defer to POA economic regulation to the extent
they defer to governmental economic regulation, nor should they impose a single
regulatory framework (due process, for example) on all POAs.3 6 Moreover, the
analogy of the POA to government disregards both the distinction between state
and private action and other important differences between POAs and govern-
ment: the tiny size of most POAs (a median of forty-three units, according to
one recent survey); 37 their narrow range of functions, at least compared to gen-
eral governments;38 and the absence of the redistributive,"9 police, conscriptive,
general welfare taxation, and enforcement privileges characteristic of sovereign
power.40 Even the closest governmental analogue, the special district, often dif-
fers from the POA in significant ways. Unlike POAs, most special districts de-
31. The term "discretionary servitudes" is employed by Reichman, Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at
139 n.1; and Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 279. For other writings adopting this analysis, see R.
NATELSON, supra note 6, at 120-23; Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors
French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL L. REv. 1403, 1408-09 (1982).
32. Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 296.
33. See infra notes 51, 54.
34. E.g., Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 418 A.2d 1233 (1980).
35. Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4, at 1520.
36. Dean Reichman itemizes a number of objections to the public law analogy. His objections include the
lack of connection between government and most POAs; the fact that the POA is more nearly voluntary than
government, accord Note, Condominium Rulemaking, supra note 11, at 657; the argument that imposition of a
single regulatory framework upon all POAs would increase gravitation toward central control and uniformity of
conduct; if public law were not made applicable to all POAs, the difficulty of determining the dividing line; the
difficulty of determining whether all forms of administrative law are relevant or only constitutional norms; the
difficulty of determining the proper consequences of a POA decision not meeting public law norms; and potentially
grave consequences for the autonomy of other private organizations. Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 255-
56, 276-78.
37. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 7. The authors admitted a sample bias toward larger subdivi-
sions-meaning the actual median is probably smaller. Although legal attention tends to focus on megacommuni-
ties, see, e.g., Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Cal. 1984), other surveys confirm
the dominance of much smaller subdivisions. See, e.g., FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 53 (median of 35
owners); FACTBOOK, supra note 7. at 3 (median of 95 owners; survey may be biased to larger POAs because of
CA! membership base). Moreover, there is a trend toward building smaller association subdivisions. CA! STUDY,
supra note 12, at 8, 48; CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 7.
38. Not only do most governments control far more functions than do POAs, but larger POAs (those most
difficult to exit) control fewer functions than do those that are intermediate in size. CAl STUDY, supra note 12,
at 50.
39. Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, 110 N.J. 650, 542 A.2d 900 (1988); Ellickson, Cities, supra
note 4, at 1524-26; accord Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 285.
40. Disobedience of government regulation entails fines, imprisonment, even death. The POA, of course, has
no imprisonment or execution power, and its fining capacity is limited severely by its operative documents and by
what the instruments of government are willing to enforce. Cf Unit Owners Ass'n of Buildameriea-1 v. Gillman,
223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982) (POA fines set aside as a privilege of government sovereignty); CALIFORNIA
STUDY, supra note 12, at 23 (most POAs do not levy fines; most fines where levied range from $25 to $100).
POA enforcement mechanisms in general are inefficient compared to those available to government. The
primary mechanism of the POA, assessment liens, hardly can be compared to government's ready access to fire-
power and moral propaganda.
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liver a single service (fire, water, sewer), but exercise sovereign power within the
scope of their duties (the emergency prerogatives of the fire department, for
example). Further, with the notable exception of school districts, the managers
of most special districts (unlike the directors of POAs) are not elected by the
people they serve.
Because of these and other difficulties with applying public law standards,
most courts and commentators have rejected those standards in favor of one or
more private law analogies. 41 As we shall see, certain underlying principles of
private law have been applied successfully in reviewing POA decisions. 42 Unfor-
tunately, some courts and commentators have lost sight of these underlying
principles in the course of borrowing rules from other contexts. Because of the
differences between POAs and those other contexts, rules that further underly-
ing principles elsewhere may not further those principles in POAs. Following is
a brief review of some of the private law models courts and commentators have
employed as sources of POA law and the distinctions that create difficulties for
those attempting to borrow rules en masse.
Some commentators resort to the law of land servitudes as a source of stan-
dards for POA review. A particular favorite is the discretionary servitude con-
cept, whereby courts sustain a developer's reservation of power to alter a servi-
tude scheme, but subject exercises of the reserved power to reasonableness
review.43 Discretionary servitude rules suffer a number of limitations in the
POA context, however. First, the management model is different: a developer,
unlike a POA board of directors, does not stand for re-election at regular inter-
vals. More importantly, the discretionary servitude doctrine is inadequate to as-
sess the full scope of the decisionmaking power of the modern POA. Discretion-
ary servitude cases are invariably mediation function cases, and they tell us
little about review in the context of the preservation and community enhance-
ment functions. Finally, discretionary servitude doctrine is hemmed in with the
restrictions of traditional servitude law. For example, traditional law provides
that covenants must touch and concern the land. This requirement poses no
problems in assessing a rule that defines the permissible hours for swimming
pool use. But an earnest application of the touch and concern test might lead to
invalidation of important and otherwise legitimate POA decisions, such as those
pertaining to social events off the premises, cable television service, the associa-
41. See, e.g., Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4; Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 276-77; Note, Condo-
minium Rulemaking, supra note 11, at 657-58. For a general discussion and citation of case law, see R. NATEL-
SON, supra note 6, at 487-92.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. The most common reservation is architectural review of proposed improvements-a mediation function.
When the POA is involved, its rights are based on its status as the developer's assignee. Illustrative cases are
Davis v. Geyer, 151 Fla. 362, 9 So. 2d 727 (1942); Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga. 100, 137 S.E.2d 288 (1964);
Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 133 III. App. 3d 327, 478 N.E.2d 860 (1985); Town & Country Estates Ass'n
v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987); Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n v. Driscoll, 106 Ohio
App. 95, 153 N.E.2d 681 (1957); Lakemoor Community Club, Inc. v. Swanson, 24 Wash. App. 10, 600 P.2d 1022
(1979).
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tion newsletter, or bus service.44 Thus, discretionary servitude precedent offers
limited usefulness in reviewing POA decisionmaking.
Another private law analogy is the fiduciary trust.45 This analogy offers the
advantage of taking into account the POA's preservation function and the risk-
adverse expectancies of its membership. Trust law also provides rules governing
mediation between holders of nonfungible interests.46 The shortcomings of the
trust law analogy are that trust rules must take into account a nondemocratic
form of management, that trust beneficiaries often are children, and that exit is
more difficult for a trust beneficiary than for a POA member. Because of the
needs of the trust context, the standards of judicial review of a trustee's deci-
sions are probably more strict than is appropriate for review of association deci-
sions. On occasion, the trust model has proven deceptive, as has been the case in
litigation between unit purchasers and subdivision developers. 7
The private law analogue to the POA most often suggested is the business
corporation. This, however, is a model fraught with difficulties. The relative fun-
gibility of shares in most corporations, at least in publicly traded firms, means
that mediation issues are of much less significance than in the POA context.48
Moreover, corporate shareholders enjoy more opportunities for easy exit than do
POA members because most corporate stock is readily marketable and most
shareholders have relatively small individual stakes.49 Bearing fairly close com-
parison to review of POA decisions are those rare cases in which a court has
reviewed corporate bylaws for reasonableness when those bylaws would injure
44. For an old case involving a forerunner of bus service, see Lyford v. Northern Pac. Coast R.R. Co., 92
Cal. 93, 28 P. 103 (1891) (promise to provide free railroad service to adjoining owner held not to run with land).
Dean Reichman would require POA regulations to touch and concern. Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at
293-94. Arguably, however, the savings in transaction costs in the POA servitude modification mechanism justifies
dispensing with the touch and concern rule in this context. But see Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988) (high transaction costs of changing servitudes justify touch and concern test).
45. Dean Reichman, among others, has suggested recourse to this model. Reichman, Residential, supra
note 4. at 296.
46. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
47. R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 450-77.
48. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4, at 1534-35 n.61:
Business shares are generally homogeneous in quality.... Moreover, business shareholders tend to have a
single common purpose: maximizing the value of their shares .... Because shareholders of a widely held
corporation tend to have common interests, a majority of shareholders cannot easily enrich itself at the
expense of a minority....
By contrast, because of the uniqueness of real estate and the emotional ties that bind one to one's
residence, an association member may have a reservation price well above market price. The member will
thus consider the effect of an amendment not only on the market value of his unit, but also on his subjec-
tive valuation of the unit. More importantly, every unit has a unique location and almost certainly other
unique features as well. These two heterogeneities-in owners' valuations and in quality of units-make it
more likely that an association's amendments (compared to a business corporation's amendments) will
seriously disgruntle a minority.
On protection from discrimination potential due to unit owner heterogeneity, see Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4,
at 922-26.
49. Contrast the typical POA unit owner with the following:
The typical shareholder (except in the closely held corporation or where one shareholder owns a very large
percentage of the shares of the corporation) is not knowledgeable about the business of the firm, does not
derive an important part of his livelihood from it, and neither expects nor has an incentive to participate in
its management. He is a passive investor and, because of the liquidity of his interest, has only a casual and
often a transitory relationship with the firm.
R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 383.
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some shareholders disproportionately."0 Those cases, however, have been disre-
garded in the search for paradigms for review of POA decisions. Instead, courts
and commentators have resorted to the business judgment rule.51 Yet the busi-
ness judgment rule is a doctrine employed to insulate officials from liability for
their acts; it is not a standard of validity.52 Moreover, at least in its common
law form, the business judgment rule is founded upon principles of enterprise
liability totally inappropriate for review of the preservation and mediation func-
tions of the POA.53 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that despite their stated
reliance upon the rule, the courts that purport to apply it to POAs actually
impose reasonableness standards substantively indistinguishable from those uti-
lized in other POA review cases.5"
The closely held corporation is potentially available as a private law ana-
logue to the POA, although commentators seem to have overlooked close corpo-
ration law as a source of POA rules. The law of close corporations does address
mediation and other issues of the kind common to those entities and to the
50. These cases tend to arise in non-profit, mutual benefit settings. 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 4177, 4191, 4195 (rev. perm. ed. 1982 & Supp. 1989). See Lambert v.
Fishermen's Dock Coop., 61 N.J. 596, 600, 297 A.2d 566, 568 (1972) ("It is the law generally that a reserved
right to amend the by-laws of an association . . . is a limited rather than an absolute right, even though the
reservation is expressed in broad and general terms.").
51. Among commentators, see, e.g., Note, Use Restrictions, supra note 11; Note, Condominium Rulemak-
ing, supra note 11. Among cases, see, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974);
Farrington v. Casa Solana Condominium Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Yorkshire Village
Community Ass'n v. Sweasy, 170 Ill. App. 3d 155, 524 N.E.2d 237 (1988); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condomin-
ium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
52. Dean Clark defines the business judgment rule as follows:
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of
business judgment-even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes-unless certain excep-
tions apply. Put another way, the rule is "a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was
taken in the best interests of the company."
R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-24 (1986) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
53. The objections to applying the business judgment rule to POAs, at least in its pure enterprise liability
form, are discussed at length in Natelson, Fiduciary, supra note 11.
The author of the 1981 Note on Condominium Rulemaking favors the business judgment rule because (1) it
avoids the public law problems of the constitutional and administrative analogies; (2) it can be used to implement
procedural fairness; and (3) "formally adopting the general corporate analogy will add an element of predictabil-
ity to condominium rulemaking, permitting condominium associations and their counsel to refer to the extensive
case law concerning the application of the business judgment rule to corporate decisionmaking." Note, Condomin-
ium Rulemaking, supra note I1, at 663-66.
However: (I) As noted in the text, there are significant differences in function and structure between Prop-
erty Owners Associations and profit corporations, and even when the business judgment rule is purportedly applied
in nonprofit organizations, the usual standard is one of reasonable care rather than of gross negligence or fraud.
W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 228-29 (3d ed. 1978). (2) Procedural review
does not depend on the business judgment rule. Courts have implemented procedural review in non-business judg-
ment rule cases, e.g., Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977),
and have disclaimed procedural review in business judgment rule cases, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo.
App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974). (3) Adoption of misleading precedents from another kind of enterprise is hardly
an advantage.
54. Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974); Farrington v. Casa Solana Condomin-
ium Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Leppaluoto v. Warm Springs Hollow Homeowners Ass'n,
114 Idaho 3, 752 P.2d 605 (1988); Yorkshire Village Community Ass'n v. Sweasy, 170 II1. App. 3d 155, 524
N.E.2d 237 (1988); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
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POA. 15  To this extent, adoption of close corporation rules in POA law would
more perfectly apply underlying principles than would adoption of rules applica-
ble to some other organizations." On the other hand, there are enough differ-
ences between close corporations and POAs to discourage borrowing close cor-
poration rules en masse."I
The law of cooperative associations represents yet another potential source
of rules. The housing cooperative, the most obvious analogue, presents difficul-
ties because of the tenurial relationship between the cooperative association and
its membership and because of the greater financial interdependence among the
members themselves.58  Cooperative associations with more prom-
ise-specifically, agricultural cooperatives and other mutual benefit socie-
ties-are never mentioned as a source of rules for POA law. They represent,
however, the closest analogue of all, and several important marketing coopera-
tive cases apply rules very similar to those adopted in reviewing decisions of
POAs.5 9
The fault in previous efforts to define the standard of review of POA deci-
sionmaking lies in the notion that one may search for a single analogue, a par-
ticular entity or concept, that is so "like" the POA that the law governing the
analogue can be transferred wholesale to the POA. In fact, however, the POA is
sui generis, and the law must treat it as such: a multiple-function private organ-
ization dedicated to preservation and mediation, democratically operated, and
composed of (usually unsophisticated) members with large, nonfungible invest-
ments for whom entrance is always readily avoidable and exit is difficult but not
impossible. In the American legal environment, there is nothing else quite like
it.
55. The close corporation shares several characteristics with the POA that represent differences from the
publicly-traded corporation. These include relative illiquidity of shares, the investors' lack of appreciation of the
risks of entering the venture, the investors' enthusiasm and relatively weak bargaining position, the significant
portion of the investors' assets invested in the venture, and the practice of entering into the venture without legal
advice. Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 71-72, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178-79, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799,
804-05 (1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289-91, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558-59 (1983).
56. See infra note 142.
57. Unlike the shares of a close corporation, an interest in a POA usually is freely alienable or subject to
only minimal transfer restraint. Most POAs have no restraints on alienability of units, except, for obvious reasons,
covenants against partition of a condominium. When restraints exist, they usually are rights of first refusal or age
limitations. Age limitations against families with children (except in retirement communities) were invalidated by
1988 amendments to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1968. Fair Housing Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430,
§ 6, 102 Stat. 1620-23 (1988). The severe restraints typical of housing cooperatives are rare in POAs. On transfer
restraints in POAs, see R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 593-610.
58. For judicial recognition of the differences between co-ops and POAs, see Sanders v. The Tropicana, 31
N.C. App. 276, 229 S.E.2d 304 (1976). Another potential analogy is the labor union, especially the industrial
union, membership in which is a condition of employment. Labor unions, however, are subject to extensive statu-
tory and administrative regulation and serve public law goals. Individual interests may be sacrificed to the policy
of furthering collective bargaining. For a discussion of the policy behind the federal labor statutes, see H. WEL-
LINGTON. LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 38-46 (1968). For a survey of the limited protections afforded
nonfungible minorities in labor unions, see D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 112-16
(1970).
59. See infra note 143. The analogy is not perfect. For example, as the case names suggest, cooperators
usually are business people with more sophistication in their enterprises than homeowners have in real estate.
Also, because these are business cooperatives, community enhancement functions play more of a role than in
POAs.
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III. PRE-EXISTING REGULATIONS: COERCION AND CONSENT
A. An Overview of the Consent/Coercion Debate
Modern courts often justify servitude provisions, including grants of discre-
tionary power to associations, on the basis that members consented to those
provisions when they purchased their units.60 As noted in the Introduction to
this Article, however, the question of whether property purchasers actually con-
sent to pre-existing servitudes (including the association's decisionmaking
power) is a controversial one. The consent theory rests upon the observation
that purchasers pay for, and accept deeds to, parcels of land while on legal
notice of encumbrances purporting to bind possessors of the land.61 We may
reduce this justification to an equation:
Acceptance of deed + Notice = Consent
Professor Richard Epstein is perhaps the leading proponent of consent the-
ory. 2 Professors Gerald Frug and Gregory Alexander, on the other hand, are
skeptical of it. They assert that at least in this context, distinctions between
consent and coercion and between private and public powers are illusory. 3 To
illustrate his point that "this public/private distinction is hypothesis and noth-
ing more,"'64 Frug observes that Professor Ellickson, a consent theory propo-
nent,65 favors compensation arrangements for association "takings" and adds:
Since a taking clause would seem an unlikely suggestion for an association truly envi-
sioned as private (such as the family), recommendation of such a clause for the home-
owners association indicates that [Ellickson] envisions these groups as having qualities
generally associated with public organizations. Like Locke, Professor Ellickson seems
to recognize that the governing board of even a 'purely voluntary' association is in-
vested with power that can threaten the association's members. .... Professor Ellick-
60. For cases relying on the consent or contract theory in this context, see, e.g., Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga.
100, 137 S.E.2d 288 (1964); Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Warren v. Del Pizzo, 46 Or.
App. 153, 611 P.2d 309, modified on other grounds, 48 Or. App. 237, 616 P.2d 1186 (1980); Sea Pines Plantation
Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 363 S.E.2d 891 (1987). Cf. Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (unit owners took subject to the covenants, including a provision permitting the association to issue
reasonable rules and regulations).
61. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4, at 914 ("It is both the decision to purchase and the notice that
constitute the consent, not either in isolation from the other.").
62. Epstein believes that the recording system enables us to discard safely certain traditional servitude limi-
tations, such as the touch and concern test, which were designed to ensure notice before the advent of the record-
ing system. Epstein, Notice, supra note 1; Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4.
63.
Choice and coercion are not alternative objective social states that either exist or do not exist. Rather they
are rhetorics that, though contradictory, are both always available as interpretations of any given social
experience. Pretending that they are more than just opposing rhetorics creates a form of nominalism that
privileges one understanding, one interpretation.
Alexander, supra note 4, at 884.
64. Frug, supra note 4, at 1590.
65. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4, at 1520: "Although cities are considered 'public' and homeowners
associations 'private,' I discern only one important difference between the two forms of organization-the some-
times involuntary nature of membership in a city versus the perfectly voluntary nature of membership in a home-
owners association."
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son apparently has no trouble in applying public law to the governance of a homeown-
ers association with at least the severity he would apply it to cities."6
Professors Frug and Alexander attack the validity of both elements on the
left side of the "Acceptance + Notice = Consent" equation. Frug implies that
acceptance of a servitude plan would be voluntary only if it "come[s] into exis-
tence by the voluntary agreement of the original settlers" rather than by volun-
tary purchase from a common developer who sets it up and offers it to the
public.67
Alexander argues more explicitly that acceptance by deed may not be real
acceptance. He notes that each servitude is "bundled" with real estate and, in
the modern covenanted subdivision, with many other servitudes. This, he sug-
gests, reduces the purchaser's right to select among available terms. Bundling
also impairs the existing owner's. ability to exit and thus limits his continuing
assent:
Exit is at best an imperfect strategy for disgruntled land owners because the immobil-
ity of their asset limits their options. They can convert their land to capital by selling
it, but selling represents capitulating on the very matter at issue: to be able to use
their land free from the unwanted height restriction. To keep the land, they must
comply with the restriction (grudging loyalty); to avoid the restriction they must give
up the land (exit).68
According to Alexander, purchaser ignorance of the market further restricts
choice. He asserts that many purchasers believe that "ownership in a residential
development without a particular restriction is unavailable. The consequences of
this pervasive belief is that one cannot simply assume that restrictions are in-
cluded in deeds because purchasers want them there.69 Maximizing the auton-
66. Frug, supra note 4, at 1591-92. The suggestion that the compensation principle is exclusively, or even
primarily, a public law principle is erroneous. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
67. Frug, supra note 4, at 1590.
68. Alexander, supra note 4, at 888. Cf. Frug, supra note 4, at 1591 ("Once a homeowner is in place, any
rule made by the governing board not authorized by the original agreement threatens him with coercion.").
69. This statement is a reflection of the hypothesis of "adaptive preferences," a hypothesis relied upon by
critical legal scholars. The principle of adaptive preferences is that some preferences arise because what people
want is unavailable. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1146-50. The hypothesis is based largely on a misreading of the
fable of the fox and the grapes, resulting in the questionable conclusion that once the fox "decided" the grapes
were sour, he would not have taken them even if they had become available. Cf. id. at 1149.
The fable actually stands for a view diametrically opposed to that propounded by the writers who rely on it as
an illustration of adaptive preferences. The message of those writers is that people are the captives of circum-
stance. The full text of Aesop's story is as follows:
A hungry fox tried to reach some clusters of grapes which he saw hanging from a vine trained on a
tree, but they were too high. So he went off and comforted himself by saying: "They weren't ripe
anyhow."
In the same way some men, when they fail through their own incapacity, blame circumstances.
FABLES OF AESOP 5 (Penguin 1954) (emphasis added).
It is doubtful whether adaptive preferences can be called preferences at all. If the phenomenon is important
in the economic world (and its proponents offer little empirical evidence that it is beyond the mere existence of the
fable), it probably reflects (as Aesop suggests) only an accommodation to the universal fact of economic scarcity,
a rationalization employed to cope with frustration. I suspect that when the scarcity disappears, the "preference"
virtually always disappears.
Professor Sunstein is considerably more tentative in his conclusions on the usefulness of the concept than is
Professor Alexander. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1148, 1150. In any event, scholars in search of literary support for
the theory of adaptive preferences would be better served by Robert Louis Stevenson than by Aesop. In Steven-
son's short story The Sire de Malktiroit's Door a young gallant, given two hours to choose between death and
1990]
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omy of purchasers' preferences may therefore require legal interference with
their nominal preferences." 70
Alexander attacks the notice element of the equation by arguing that legal
notice is not a sufficient basis for consent, presumably even if acceptance were
free:
[T]he purchaser who acted without actual notice that the land she purchased was
affected with an obligation may still be held to have had notice. The legal notion of
constructive notice, provided by the land recording system, or by the surrounding cir-
cumstances, which may place on the purchaser a duty to inquire about the existence of
restrictions creates thisnotice. If we base an inference of consent on this type of notice
we greatly diminish the meaning, and the normative power, of consent. 1
1. Assessing Acceptance: Initial Observations
Professors Frug and Alexander and Professor Epstein arrive at polar posi-
tions by their respective treatments of the elements on the left side of the con-
sent formula. Frug and Alexander set unrealistic standards for acceptance. Ep-
stein overestimates the power of legal notice to bring facts to the attention of
the unit purchaser. Let us turn to the acceptance issue first.
For purposes of discussing acceptance, assume that the purchaser is fully
aware of the terms of the deal and has agreed to purchase only after examining
the documentation and reviewing all salient points with a lawyer. In other
words, assume that the purchaser'has good product knowledge. Professors Frug
and Alexander seem to be saying that product knowledge is not sufficient for
real acceptance, that real acceptance occurs only if the purchaser has perfect
market knowledge and the opportunity to negotiate every term in the package.
As Professor Epstein observes, the Frug/Alexander standards of accept-
ance would make it impossible to classify as consensual a transaction in which
shoelaces were "bundled" with a sale of shoes.72 If consent is impossible when
there is bundling or imperfect market knowledge, a shoe-and-lace purchase
marriage to a particular lady, manages to fall in love with her within the alloted time. See THE COMPLETE SHORT
STORIES OF ROBERT Louis STEVENSON 231-54 (C. Neider ed. 1969). One might ask, however, whether his love
would survive their first marital quarrel.
70. Alexander, supra note 4, at 894.
71. Alexander, supra note 4, at 892-93 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 892-93, 901, nn.27, 28, 52
(referring to practical shortcomings in the notice system).
Why, in view of Professor Alexander's arguments, could anyone maintain that servitude regulation is consen-
sual? Professor Alexander sets up his answer by observing that Dean Reichman favors the touch and concern test
because he believes it maximizes freedom of choice while Professor Epstein opposes touch and concern because he
believes it restricts freedom of choice. Alexander then concludes:
The choice between these two contradictory interpretations cannot be based on an abstract commit-
ment to freedom of choice itself; both choices are simultaneously freedom-enhancing and coercive. Epstein
and Reichman want to sanctify a subjective political choice-the allocation of power between generations
of owners-by a linguistic gambit, namely, objectifying their political preference as choice maximizing
and therefore more consistent with the general policy of servitude law.
Id. at 891-92.
Perhaps a more nearly correct answer is that Professor Epstein and Dean Reichman recognize that any rule
adopted is likely to restrict choice, but differ as to which rule will restrict it less. The cause of their disagreement
is not a carelessness for freedom; it arises from a lack of empirical research.
72. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4, at 912.
[Vol. 51:41
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
would be characterized as coercive if the purchaser did not both (1) undertake
an exhaustive. survey of the world shoe-and-lace market and (2) dicker all terms
(before the market changed) with each provider in the shoe-and-lace marketing
chain-retailer, wholesaler, manufacturer, and raw material suppliers. Alexan-
der seems to believe such a characterization (that is, "coercive") would be plau-
sible or at least "available" to describe a shoe-and-lace purchase, for choice and
coercion "are rhetorics that . . . are both always available as interpretations of
any given social experience. '7 3 This reasoning, as Professor Epstein notes,
proves too much: the term "choice" is available to describe torture in a Cuban
prison cell on the basis that one "chose" that course by demonstrating against
the Castro government while aware of the consequences. But to agree that such
usages are "available" is not to concede that they are accurate or that they
inform us of more than they cdnceal.
One can argue convincingly that in the absence of monopoly,14 bundling
and volitional purchase under conditions of imperfect market knowledge are in
fact choice-maximizing rather than choice-restricting; that is, the free market
offers bundled goods and purchasers buy them under conditions of imperfect
knowledge and limited dickering when on the whole, the cost of offering inde-
pendent goods and acquiring more perfect knowledge would reduce the range of
people's legally protected choices more than expand them. Obversely put, the
proposition is that at our present state of technology, if the courts refused to
enforce agreements that arose without unlimited dickering and perfect market
knowledge, there would be very few legally enforceable choices made. This
would be true because people could not find the time to arrive at very many
enforceable agreements, because it would be exceedingly difficult to execute any
such agreements,75 and because the government could second-guess any agree-
ments they managed to execute.
The last point-government second-guessing as inimical to meaningful con-
sent-is worth emphasis because it is so often overlooked. When a purchaser
has good product information, government oversight substitutes an official's pre-
sumed knowledge of the needs of others for the purchaser's knowledge of him-
self. It substitutes a decisionmaker with his own interests and distractions76 (the
politician, bureaucrat, or communally authorized neighborhood busybody 77 ) for
a purchaser with undivided loyalty to his own welfare. For reasons of both util-"
ity and personal freedom, therefore, the advocates of any particular plan for
government review of independent decisionmaking bear the burden of demon-
73. Alexander, supra note 4, at 884 (emphasis added).
74. The housing sales market is highly competitive, and there can be no supportable allegations of monopoly
in the sale of POA units. See, e.g., Levinson v. Maison Grande, 517 F. Supp. 963 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (jury found
defendants did not have sufficient power in the market to sustain plaintiff's antitrust claim).
75. Because the facts of the market change constantly, consent would be valid only for an instant. A free
exchange requires simultaneous choices by at least two people-quite difficult when consent for each is so fleeting.
76. See Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4, at 925. Professor Sunstein suggests that collective decisionmaking
can, through the process of political discourse, intelligently separate supportable claims from claims based on
"naked preferences." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1136. To those with political experience or historical training, this
suggestion must seem overly sanguine.
77. See Ignatius, China's Golden Girls Monitor Neighbors, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1989, at A6, col. 4
(describing oversight functions of "neighborhood committees" in Communist China).
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strating that in a given situation consumers are so apt to miscalculate and the
costs of miscalculation are so disastrous and so nearly irreversible that the mar-
ket cannot be relied upon to maximize choice. This demonstration ideally should
be made on the basis of empirical experience, not on the basis of the politician's
(or the scholar's) intuitive guess as to what might be good for other people. The
historical demonstration has been sufficient, I think, to justify rules forbidding
people from selling themselves into slavery or, what is much the same thing,
prohibiting addiction to heroin.78 There has been no demonstration, however, of
market failure in the sale of shoes or in the purchase of units in an association
subdivision.79
2. Assessing Notice: Initial Observations
A more serious challenge to the consent equation can be made by question-
ing the soundness of the element of notice as an indicator of product knowl-
edge. Professor Epstein maintains that the recording system provides adequate
notice to enable the consumer to exercise genuine choice in deciding whether to
subject himself to a servitude scheme. This position, however, is open to chal-
lenge on several grounds. Professor Alexander suggests one basis for challenge:
case law puts property purchasers on notice of many unrecorded circumstances.
This is not merely the peripheral problem Epstein suggests it is.8" Recorded
standards for the exercise of discretion frequently are absent or are so broad
78. The reference to heroin should not be taken as an endorsement of the common view that government is
justified in imposing its "second order preferences" on those out of power. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2.
Advocates of that view, including Professor Sunstein, sometimes turn for support to the fable of Odysseus and the
Sirens as exemplifying a proper use of government power.
Upon investigation, this reliance upon Homer turns out to be as misguided as the critical legal scholars'
reliance upon Aesop. See supra note 69. The story of Odysseus and the Sirens is a tale of the abuse of power, not
of its proper use. In the story, Odysseus decided to take advantage of his position as ship's captain to listen to the
music of the Sirens-a pleasure that usually led to death on the shoals. Most of the costs of Odysseus' irresponsi-
bility were passed on to his men: they were denied the opportunity to hear the song (or anything else), being
required to keep their ears plugged with wax; they had to bind their captain to the mast (twice); and they did all
the rowing while Odysseus did all the listening. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 185-87 (S. Butcher & A. Lang trans.
1950).
Professor Sunstein calls legislation of this type a "voluntary foreclosure of consumption choices" and cites
mandatory seat belt laws as an example. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1140. However, such laws are "voluntary"
only to those in control of the government, and they are improper precisely for the reason Odysseus' action was
improper: they impose the costs of some people's lack of control (irresponsibility) on innocent, responsible parties
with different second order preferences. In the seat belt context, all or some of the cost of irresponsibility is shifted
to responsible people who recognize that under some circumstances (when ministering to children, for example)
the utility of removing a seat belt may exceed the utility of keeping it on.
Self-restraint laws are not open to the cost-shifting objection if they do not shift costs. Thus, the constitu-
tional rights of individuals place the cost of potential government incontinence exactly where it belongs--on the
government. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1141. Statutes forbidding heroin use cause no loss (other than adminis-
trative cost) to responsible people, because unlike alcohol, tobacco, or nonuse of seatbelts, heroin cannot be con-
sumed responsibly. When, however, administrative cost exceeds utility gain, a society will wish to re-examine even
statutes forbidding heroin.
79. This statement presumes product knowledge even in the absence of market knowledge. Recall that in
considering the acceptance element of the "acceptance + notice = consent" equation, we are assuming the pur-
chaser has knowledge of all aspects of the deal.
80. Epstein, Covenants, supra note 4, at 911. For another view of the problem of notice, see Winokur, supra
note 4, at 59-62.
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that a court must refer to the condition of the subdivision, physical" l or other-
wise,8 2 in order to give them content. Often the inquiry must be into the condi-
tion of the subdivision at some time prior to the time of trial."
In many parts of the country, the recording system is so poorly organized,
so overloaded,8 4 and so incompetently operated as to be of limited utility. The
courts often refuse to bind litigants to the "notice" it affords.8 5 Moreover, some
of the classic cases on the subject of inquiry notice arose because of defects in
the recording system.86 In recent decades, private enterprise (specifically ab-
stractors and title insurance companies) has come to the rescue of the govern-
ment recording system, just as private couriers have rescued the United States
Postal Service. Part of the value of private title examiners is that they offer
expert navigation through the shoals of the county records. Increasingly, how-
ever, title examiners disregard the county records except as a source of new
filings, and instead operate their own computer-operated databases.8"
The clumsiness of the recording system is such that if the typical unit
buyer is to examine the servitude scheme, he probably will have to acquire the
operative documents from the developer, the association, an abstractor, a title
company, a lawyer, or a real estate broker. As a rule, one of these individuals or
entities does provide the purchaser with the documents, although often not as
promptly as would be ideal."8
In the ordinary use of the term, one does not "assent" to a state of affairs
merely because it was possible to learn of that state of affairs. In ordinary us-
age, one "assents" to a situation when one affirmatively accepts it while know-
81. Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater,
227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987).
82. Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (residential nature of subdivision guided
discretion on approval or disapproval of purchasers).
83. See. e.g., Ottawa Shores Home Owners' Ass'n v. Lechlak, 344 Mich. 366, 73 N.W.2d 840 (1955); Davis
v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1981) (state of development when owner purchased) .
84. For a comment on the phenomenon of overloading the recording system, see Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 585-90 (1988).
85. In Montana, for example, the recording system in many counties is poorly organized and inaccessible.
Land transactions in Montana usually are relatively informal. Perhaps because of the interplay of these factors,
the state supreme court has never enforced a covenant against a party without reciting some reason why the owner
should have known of the covenant beyond the fact that it was recorded. Natelson, Running with the Land in
Montana, 51 MONsT. L. REv. 17, 72 (1990). See also Goeres v. Lindey's, Inc., 190 Mont. 172, 619 P.2d 1194
(1980) (refusing to enforce reciprocal negative easements based on recorded deed outside lot owner's chain of title
in absence of finding that lot owner had actual knowledge of restrictions prior to purchase).
The foregoing applies to Montana alone, but judicial reluctance to bind people to the purely constructive
notice of the recording system cuts across state lines. By way of illustration, in oil and gas law the scope of the
covenant of general warranty is often limited by excepted interests of which the grantee has actual notice, but not
by excepted interests of which the grantee has record notice only. Compare Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d
144 (N.D. 1981) (actual notice) and Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) (actual knowledge) with
Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1984) (record notice only). Cf. E. KUNTZ. J. LOWE, 0. ANDERSON & E.
SMn. CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 579 (1986). See also the cases set forth infra notes 106 -
11, in none of which the court relied exclusively upon the recording system to establish notice.
86. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925), which Alexander cites. In
Sanborn the court enforced restrictions that did not appear in the lot owner's chain of title, but that would have so
appeared in a rational system of registration.
87. These are called title plants. See Johnstone, Land Transfers: Process and Processors, 22 VAL U.L. REV.
493, 507 (1988).
88. R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 371.
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ing of it or, although ignorant of the details, makes a conscious decision to
proceed without information that one knows to be available at little effort or
cost-that is, information of which one has actual, as opposed to merely legal,
notice. Thus, the average person might say that Deborah, a homeowner, ac-
cepted the terms of a "simple" landscaping agreement if she signed the contract
without bothering to read it, for if the contract is "simple," she knows that full
product information is available at little effort or cost. However, "little effort or
cost" is a relative term; it depends upon the magnitude of the interests at stake.
If the landscaping project involved the replacement of two small bushes, most
people probably would conclude that it would involve little effort or cost for
Deborah to read a seventy-five-word contract. On the other hand, if the project
involved extensive landscaping for a large apartment complex, one might rea-
sonably expect Deborah to read a 500-word document. One might say that even
if she did not read the document, she had actual notice of its contents.
The question arises as to how one treats a contract when product informa-
tion is unknown and is available only at great effort or cost. Suppose that
Deborah was unschooled in landscaping terminology and that the bush-replace-
ment contract was contained in a 2000-word form supplied by the landscaping
company. Suppose further that it included significant but innocent-appearing
provisions with specialized meanings whose content could be known only by ref-
erence to a manual of industry standards.8 9 Deborah probably would be on ac-
tual notice of some, but not all, terms of the contract. In this event, resort may
be had to Llewellyn's standard for interpreting acceptance of a boilerplate form:
assent to dickered terms and to the "broad type of the transaction" and "a
blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms
the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms." 90 The economic justification for this standard
is that in the usual boilerplate transaction it is not efficient for the recipient of
the form to examine terms in the form that do not affect the core of the trans-
action. Reasonableness review provides necessary content to Llewellyn's "blan-
ket assent."'"
The formidable appearance and technical language of the operative docu-
ments of many POAs suggest resort to Llewellyn's boilerplate standards, but
the suggestion is misleading. However dense the operative documents may be,
purchase of a subdivision unit is not the normal boilerplate transaction. In the
normal boilerplate transaction the price is low enough that examination of the
boilerplate would be needlessly time-consuming and employment of legal coun-
sel would not be cost-effective. In the purchase of real estate, however, the sales
89. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (Usage of trade qualifies or supplements other terms only if both parties are
engaged in trade or "of which they are or should be aware.").
90. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 370 (emphasis added).
91. Cf. American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report
and Second Draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act in I UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 304 (E. Kelly ed.
1984) ("[T]he position of the Draft is that the reasonableness of assuming both parties to have chosen and agreed
to incorporate such a set of clauses, in silence and without dickering, depends upon whether the series of clauses
presents the kind of balanced background which parties can fairly, or indeed accurately, be thought to incorporate
by silence.").
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price is significant enough to render examination of the documents and employ-
ment of legal counsel highly cost-effective.92 Moreover, in the usual form trans-
action only one party, the drafter, is relying on the boilerplate. In sales of units
in association subdivisions many other unit purchasers are relying upon it.93
We are now faced with four observations on notice that imply varying re-
sults. The inadequacies of the recording system are such that it does not provide
purchasers with actual notice of the terms of subdivision documents. The fact
that those purchasers often receive the materials too late to examine them also
suggests absence of actual notice. On the other hand, the common practice of
title companies, developers, and brokers of giving the documents to prospective
purchasers suggests that many purchasers have the opportunity to examine the
documents before they agree to buy, and the nature and importance of the
transaction imply that purchasers are under a far heavier burden to examine
those documents and therefore are more readily chargeable with actual notice
than in the usual boilerplate contract.
Under these circumstances, whether purchasers have actual notice of the
terms of subdivision documents is not a question that can be answered a priori
or on the basis of anecdotal evidence;94 it needs to be answered empirically.
3. Notice and Consent: The Empirical Evidence and Judicial Response
In the POA context, a purchaser needs actual notice of certain facts in
order to give effective consent to the substance and procedures of existing asso-
ciation regulations. These facts include the existence of a scheme of land gov-
ernance, the presence of an association, the content of the regulations as of the
date of purchase, and the general scope of the association's power to alter the
regulatory scheme in the future. We can say that a purchaser accepting a deed
with such product information really did consent to the substance of the trans-
action. Whether acceptance takes place in conditions of actual notice, therefore
resulting in effective consent, may vary from time to time and from place to
place.
92. The cost of legal counsel is likely to be minimal in comparison to the cost of the real estate being
purchased. In southeastern New York State, for example, the prevailing fees for representation in a residential
real estate purchase from contract through closing are less than one percent of the unit sales price.
93. See Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So.
2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
When the prospective buyer of a POA unit has an opportunity both to examine the documents (such as
servitudes and the buy-sell agreement) governing the transaction and to employ legal counsel, the buyer is well
positioned to avoid future dissatisfaction with the deal. The buyer potentially dissatisfied with the servitudes, upon
which other purchasers rely, is the least cost avoider because he can purchase elsewhere. The buyer dissatisfied
with the buy-sell agreement is the least cost avoider because he may purchase elsewhere or renegotiate. Despite
the belief of some commentators that a developer's form contracts are set in stone, my own experience as a
practitioner indicates otherwise. For a case in which buyers renegotiated a developer's terms, see Wechsler v.
Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 196S).
94. Anecdotal evidence can be found to support both sides of the argument over whether prospective pur-
chasers have actual notice. Professor Winokur collects evidence on both sides, although predominately against
notice. Winokur, supra note 4, at 59 n.246. In my own practice experience, spanning a decade of representing
middle and working class people in real estate transactions and in postelosing disputes, I encountered only one
client who had been unaware of the existence of the association or the general regulatory scheme prior to
purchase, and that was a de minimis association.
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Dr. Vivian Walker conducted an empirical survey of condominium owners
in Chicago during 1979 and 1980. In addition to a wider sampling, she con-
ducted two-hour personal interviews with forty-three condominium owners.95
She reports that although most people obtained the condominium documents
before purchase,96 few read them or were fully aware of their significance.9 7
Her opinion is that meaningful knowledge of on-going condominium operations
would have been difficult to obtain in Chicago at that time because of the nov-
elty of the condominium concept and the overheated nature of the market. She
questions the effectiveness of consent under such circumstances.98
On the other hand, a more recent and far larger survey suggests that at
other places and times there can be effective consent. In 1987 Professors Steven
Williamson and Ronald Adams surveyed a random sample of 767 Florida con-
dominium owners.99 Several of the survey questions were designed to elicit rea-
sons for the owners' purchases. Over ninety-two percent of the respondents con-
sidered the existence of the regulatory scheme to be "very important" or
"important" to their determination to purchase, and nearly eighty-five percent
considered participation in an association to have been "very important" or
"important" to that decision.1"' Of course, those results would not have been
possible unless the purchasers had known of the existence of the scheme and of
the association prior to purchase. Such widespread knowledge is not surprising,
given the existence of a Florida disclosure law mandating that purchasers re-
ceive condominium documentation prior to purchase, 01 the growth of consumer
awareness since the Walker survey, and the widespread practice of sales agents
of outlining the major existing regulations to prospective purchasers ("no chil-
dren, no pets over 20 pounds") in order to avoid later demands for rescission.
The conclusion that Florida purchasers had advance knowledge of what they
were purchasing receives inferential support from the extremely high levels of
owner satisfaction found in the study. 02
95. The wider survey was of 599 owners in five different cities, but the results reported here do not rest on
the wider survey. For her methodology, see V. Walker, supra note 12, at iii, 10.
96. As required by ILL ANN. STAT., ch. 30, para. 322 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
97. Telephone Interview with Vivian G. Walker, Ph.D., Instructor, Kellogg Graduate School of Manage-
ment, Northwestern University and past president of the Community Associations Institute Research Foundation
(Jul. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
98. Id.
99. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 43.
100. Owners were asked whether "rules and regulations which affect my lifestyle" were "very important,"
"important," "unimportant," or "totally unimportant" to their purchase decision. The respective percentage re-
sponses from the entire sample were 34.0, 58.6, 6.0, and 1.4. Owners were asked whether "ability to exert control
over expenses and management through a democratic owner's association" was "very important," "important,"
.unimportant," or "totally unimportant" to their purchase decision. The respective percentage responses from the
entire sample were 25.4, 59.2, 13.4, and 2.0. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 56.
101. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(2) (West 1988) (requiring seller to provide buyer with copies of
governing documents).
102. 81.2% of respondents stated that they would purchase the same condominium unit if given the choice to
do so again. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 69.
These findings are consistent with those of other surveys. See, e.g., R. Burby, supra note 12, at 13-15 (satis-
faction level with recreational facilities, maintenance of common properties, social activities and programs, archi-
tectural control, representation of residents' views to local government, and representation of residents' views to
developer all well in excess of 80%). The latter study offers an interesting commentary on the value of federalism.
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The Florida findings do not demonstrate that purchasers knew of all mat-
ters important to consent. They might well have been ignorant of existing regu-
lations unlikely to be emphasized by sales personnel or of the association's
power to alter existing regulations. Nevertheless, based upon what the Florida
purchasers already knew, we may conclude that they consented to the remain-
ing regulations and to the association's alteration power because they had actual
notice of them: with actual knowledge of the broad terms of the governing docu-
ments, with the documents themselves in hand, and with legal counsel available
and cost-effective to use, ignorance of additional information about the servi-
tude scheme must have been the result of a conscious choice not to obtain such
information, even though the purchasers were aware that it was available at
little effort or cost.10 3
It may be argued that a purchaser's decision to proceed without easily and
inexpensively obtainable product information is an irrational choice, and thus
not a choice at all. But there is no normative or empirical standard that holds
that all choice must be rational-even if uniform rationality would make eco-
nomic models more accurate. Further, a purchaser may have excellent reasons
for deliberately deciding to proceed with only imperfect product knowledge. It
may be necessary to act quickly in order to lock in a favorable price in a rapidly
appreciating real estate market. The purchaser may have a personal need for
quick action-establishing a tax deduction in the current fiscal year, for exam-
ple, obtaining alternate housing before a current lease expires, or acquiring title
for a projected resale.'0 '
Consistently with the findings of the Williamson survey, the Florida courts
have determined that there usually is effective consent to decisions predating a
unit owner's purchase and that such decisions are not subject to reasonableness
review on a challenge by that owner. In the language of the leading Florida
case, pre-existing regulations
are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that
each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restric-
tions to be imposed.. . . [Such a regulation] may have a certain degree of unreasona-
bleness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts.'05
The conclusion of the court that "each... owner purchases his unit know-
ing of ... the restrictions" derives force from the fact patterns of the applicable
cases. In virtually all of the "consent" cases there is evidence that the dissatis-
fied unit owner knew of a pre-existing restriction or exercised a conscious deter-
mination not to learn. Thus, the unit owner may be a subdivision developer
It found that resident satisfaction tends to be higher in decentralized, "federalized" POAs than in centralized
POAs. despite the fact that centralized POAs provide more services more efficiently. Id.
103. See supra text following note 88.
104. Judge Adkins discusses the investment-driven motives of many or most Florida condominium buyers in
Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 660 (Fla. 1983) (Adkins, J., dissenting). Cf. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12,
at 56 (74% of condominium owners purchased in part for investment opportunity).
105. Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Those words
referred to a condominium declaration, but the principle has since been extended to other rules in effect when a
unit oviner purchased. Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1935).
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whose own lawyer drafted a restriction, 06 a purchaser who agreed to a regula-
tion in writing, 107 an experienced real estate dealer who admitted knowing of a
restriction, 08 a landlord or tenant wh6 deliberately crossed out a "no children"
provision in a POA's standard lease,'0 9 a purchaser in an all-adult subdivision
that was widely promoted as such," 0 or a pet owner who admitted knowing at
the time of purchase that she would not be able to replace her dog."'
Besides the obvious normative basis for holding one to the terms one has
agreed to, the result in these Florida cases is justifiable on efficiency grounds.
As between the unit purchaser potentially dissatisfied with the terms of the gov-
erning documents and those other purchasers who potentially rely upon them,
the potentially dissatisfied purchaser is the least cost avoider. He can avoid the
cost by buying elsewhere or, if he has already purchased, by selling.
The courts of several other states follow the Florida rule and grant a pre-
existing POA decision a strong presumption of validity against a challenge from
a unit owner who purchased a unit after the association had promulgated its
decision." 2 The courts of those states are justified in doing so if the relevant
circumstances are similar to those in the Florida cases. This may or may not be
true. There are local and temporal differences in the efficacy of recording sys-
tems, in the content and effectiveness of disclosure statutes, in relevant customs,
and in the nature of the market. All of these factors may affect the determina-
tion of whether the potentially dissatisfied purchaser really did consent to the
regulations and whether that purchaser is the least cost avoider. The discrep-
ancy between the Walker and the Williamson findings illustrates this point.
In each state, therefore, the judiciary must determine the extent to which
POA unit purchasers are likely to have given effective consent-that is, whether
they know of pre-existing regulations or remain in ignorance only as a result of
a conscious decision not to acquire information available at little cost or ef-
fort."13 Moreover, in some cases a court will have to consider the circumstances
106. LeFebvre v. Osterndorf, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 275 N.W.2d 154 (1979).
107. Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
108. Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
109. Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
110. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
111. Wilshire Condominium Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
112. Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (bylaws); Unit
Owners Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982) (house rules).
113. For example, the Massachusetts condominium law provides that the bylaws should contain any restric-
tions on the use of units and that the bylaws must be recorded with the master deed. In Johnson v. Keith, 368
Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975), a unit pet regulation was imposed by a house rule rather than a bylaw. The
unit owner knew of the house rule prior to purchase, but because of the statutory scheme, other buyers might not
think to look beyond the bylaws for unit use restrictions.
The Supreme Judicial Court struck down the house rule, holding that it should have been written in the
bylaws. Id. at 320, 331 N.E.2d at 882. This was not a necessary construction of the statute; the statute did not
forbid imposition of additional unit restrictions by house rule. However, the court's conclusion was correct on the
following grounds: (1) Because of the legally sanctioned custom of inserting unit use restrictions in the bylaws,
Massachusetts condominium buyers were likely to overlook restrictions located in the house rules; (2) house rules,
if predating the owner's purchase, were subject to reasonableness review rather than the presumption of validity
granted restrictions to which an owner consents; and (3) the particular rule (a flat ban on pets) was unreasonable
because it imposed disproportionate loss, without compensation, on a particular class of members (pet owners).
See infra Part V.
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of the particular POA. If, for example, the complaining unit owner did not
know of a regulation prior to purchase, and it was not readily available to pro-
spective purchasers, that regulation should not be granted a strong presumption
of validity. It should be subject to reasonableness review.
IV. REGULATION WITHOUT CONSENT
A. The Efficiency Principle
All courts apply a reasonableness standard to POA decisions to which the
complaining unit owners have not effectively consented-those adopted after the
unit owners purchased," 4 memorialized in a place other than that dictated by
law or custom, 15 or based on management policy derived from pre-existing reg-
ulations but not clearly inferable from those regulations. 6 Although the Flor-
ida courts recently have assumed the lead in applying the reasonableness stan-
dard to POAs, reasonableness review of POA decisions was first applied in New
York. "
Property lawyers best remember Judge Irving Lehman of the New York
Court of Appeals for his opinion in Neponsit Property Owners' Association v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,' 7 but his ruling in Drabinsky v. Sea Gate
Association,"8 issued thirteen years earlier, has proven equally important. The
facts of Drabinsky were that in 1897 a developer owning land near Coney Is-
land in Brooklyn filed a subdivision plat and proceeded to construct a private
A court's judgment may also be affected by the local value hierarchy, as the history of interpretation of the
"Uniform" Commercial Code demonstrates. Compare Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal.3d 671, 148
Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978) (recognizing negligence cause of action outside Code by free construction of
Code; holding bank to high standard by determining that check payable to bank not equivalent of bearer paper)
with Indyk v. Habib Bank Ltd., 694 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying New York policies encouraging free flow of
commercial paper by strict Code construction); Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Systems, 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979)
(same); and J. Gordon Neely Enters. v. American Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 403 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1981) (holding
bank to lower standard by determining that check payable to bank is equivalent of bearer paper). Compare also
the differing judicial attitudes in widely separated states in two U.C.C. faithless employee cases: J. Gordon Neely
and Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231 Or. 106, 370 P.2d 726, opinion clarified on denial ofreh'g,
231 Or. 129, 372 P.2d 187 (1962). In each state egalitarianism, flexibility, certainty, alienability, and other values
rest on different levels of the value hierarchy.
114. Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974); Juno By the Sea N. Condominium
Ass'n v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1981);
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v.
Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Monell v. Golfview Road Ass'n, 359 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hidden Harbour
Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 46
Md. App. 464, 418 A.2d 1233 (1980); Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n v. Halpern, 181 N.J. Super. 93, 436
A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct. 1981); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1977).
115. Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975). See supra note 113.
116. Chateau Village N. Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1982); Lyons v. King, 397
So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
117. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
118. 239 N.Y. 321, 146 N.E. 614 (1925). Judge Lehman composed another important POA case, now also
neglected: In re Public Beach, 269 N.Y. 64, 199 N.E. 5 (1935), was a condemnation proceeding in which the
court of appeals permitted the Neponsit POA to represent its unit owners in their claims for lost easement rights
in an association-owned common beach. The holding in Public Beach was critical to the "vertical privity" portion
of the later Neponsit case.
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residential park. The Sea Gate subdivision included, among other amenities, an
ocean beach, a bathhouse, and a stable. In order to prevent this "healthful resi-
dential colony" from being overrun by the "excursionists" who frequented Co-
ney Island, the developer provided a single entrance to Sea Gate, monitored by
a guard and (as the subdivision's name might imply) a gate. From the entrance
way, private streets branched out to serve the various lots.119
In 1899 the developer established the Sea Gate Association, a POA in
which lot owner membership was voluntary. The following year, the developer
conveyed a lot to Jacob Mack, and in 1901 it delegated to the association own-
ership of and responsibility for the entrance way, the common streets, and the
common amenities.120
In 1919 the association adopted a series of rules that regulated admission
to the private streets, although there was no recorded document expressly grant-
ing the POA the right to do so. The following year, Wolf Drabinsky purchased
the Mack lot from Mack's successor-in-interest. Drabinsky declined to join the
association and sued to enjoin enforcement of the entrance regulations.' 2 '
Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Lehman held that the association
had the right to issue regulations governing admission to the subdivision, pro-
vided such regulations were "reasonable and adapted solely to [the subdivi-
sion's] purpose and are equally applied.' 22 In doctrinal terms, Judge Lehman
ruled that when the developer granted an easement to Mack, the developer im-
pliedly reserved from that grant the power to issue reasonable rules for the use
of the easement; this reservation passed to the POA in 1901, along with other
common area ownership and responsibility. Drabinsky purchased Mack's ease-
ment subject to that reservation.
Essentially, Judge Lehman held that a rule was reasonable if it was within
the scope of what Jacob Mack might have foreseen. What Mack'might have
foreseen could be determined from examining the circumstances as they existed
in 1900 and ascertaining what he must have known about other lot purchasers'
expectations of what the subdivision would be.'23 The court concluded that
Mack could expect that the association would act in a way appropriate to pre-
serve the character of Sea Gate, for only the association could protect Sea Gate
without incurring prohibitive transaction costs."24 The court added that rules
119. 239 N.Y. at 324-25, 146 N.E. at 614-15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 329, 146 N.E. at 617.
123. All the purchasers of lots in Sea Gate received the same easement. If one person is permitted to use
the streets in such a manner as would tend to destroy its character as a street in a private residential
colony, then all the others who purchased upon the understanding that the use of the street might be
appropriately restricted would lose some of the benefit of their purchase.
Id. at 327-28, 146 N.E. at 616.
124. Of course, in the absence of association rulemaking power the lot owners could regulate by unanimous
consent. That, however, would be a clumsy procedure and an invitation to holdouts. Only the association, noted
Judge Lehman, "is in a position to formulate general rules which will preserve the rights of all parties and restrict
the use of the street to the purpose for which it was granted." Id. at 328, 146 N.E. at 616.
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that might protect the Sea Gate community by restricting individual preroga-
tives were within the scope of foreseeability. 125
Despite doctrinal differences between Drabinsky and more modern cases, 128
many of the latter also express the view that the purchaser who buys with no-
tice of a discretionary power accepts the risk that the power may be used in a
way that benefits the commonality but harms the individual.2 7 Under this the-
ory, the consent to the association's rulemaking power implies consent to the
substance of future decisionmaking, so long as future decisions serve overall
efficiency purposes and association officials do not violate their fiduciary
obligations." 8
B. Limits of the Efficiency Principle
Yet, risk-acceptance analysis and the efficiency principle do not fully ex-
plain many other reasonableness review cases. Risk-acceptance and efficiency do
not even folly explain Drabinsky. After sustaining the reasonableness of one
rule, the Drabinsky court discussed another, one restricting a lot owner to ten
guests per day. Although the court could have employed risk-acceptance and
efficiency analysis either to sustain or to invalidate the rule, the court instead
relied upon the rights of property:
The right of the plaintiff to use his own property in any lawful manner he sees fit
except as restricted by the deed of conveyance to him, cannot be disputed, yet by this
rule the defendant [POA], as the owner of the bed of the street, assumes to limit the
number of guests the plaintiff may receive on any one day .... The plaintiff has the
right to decide for himself how many persons he will receive in his home .... [This
rule], if enforced, would infringe upon his property rights and give the owner of the
bed of the street the right to dictate the use to which plaintiff may put his own
property.129
The foregoing language strongly suggests that the mere fact that a POA
resolution is efficient and foreseeable does not mean that a court will necessarily
125. The Sea Gate court spoke of "the formulation of regulations ... for the benefit of all property owners"
and "notice ... that such restriction ... would be imposed." Id. at 328, 329, 146 N.E. at 616, 617.
126. Sea Gate was a property conveyancing case, as are some of the modern decisions. See, e.g., Howorka v.
Harbor Island Owners' Ass'n, 292 S.C. 381, 356 S.E.2d 433 (1987) (developer conveyed easement subject to
POA's pre-existing rulemaking power). Many other modem cases, however, rely upon contract or statutory bases.
127. Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("Plaintiff
acquired title to her condominium unit with knowledge that the Declaration of Condominium might thereafter be
lawfully amended"); Warren v. Del Pizzo, 46 Or. App. 153, 611 P.2d 309, modified on other grounds, 48 Or.
App. 237, 616 P.2d 1186 (1980) (similar language); Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642,
652, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209, 215 (1983) (holding that a POA acting for the group is incapable of violating a duty to
an individual); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (each unit
owner must give up freedom of choice and property rights for benefit of majority); Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d
196. 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("balancing of rights of the individual unit owner and of the entire residential
community"; "individual owners come together and agree to subordinate some of their traditional ownership rights
and privileges when they choose this type of ownership experience"). See O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condo-
minium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174
Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
128. On those obligations, see R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 446-84.
129. 239 N.Y. at 330-31, 146 N.E. at 617.
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permit the resolution to stand. It will be invalidated if it invades a unit owner's
"property" rights. Similar sentiments pervade modern cases on the subject. 3
The fact that the courts find it necessary to protect the unit owner from the
consequences of his "consent"' 3'11 suggests that the courts are uncomfortable
with consent theory as a basis for the decisionmaking power. And well they
should be. Unit owners do not give advance consent to the substance of future
POA decisions because there cannot be advance knowledge of them. Such deci-
sions, therefore, are more nearly coercive than consensual. 32 The courts review
POA decisions on a reasonableness standard not because that standard defines
the scope of consent, but because, as we shall see, the standard serves as a
plausible substitute for consent.
C. The Unanimity and Compensation Principles
Courts adjusting burdens among parties who, because of high transaction
costs, cannot negotiate their own adjustments, often attempt to approximate the
deal the parties might have made for themselves if transaction costs had been
lower."' In the POA context, agreement between the developer and unit pur-
130. See Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (op-
pression not permitted); Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So.2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("retro-
active" regulation voided); Monell v. Golfview Road Ass'n, 359 So. 2d 2, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to
balance conveniences where unit owner's "easement ... was substantially diminished"); River Terrace Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Lewis, 33 Ohio App. 3d 52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986) (discrimination not permitted). For compa-
rable language, see Casita de Castilian, Inc. v. Kamrath, 129 Ariz. 146, 629 P.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1981); Thanasou-
lis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, Inc., 110 N.J. 650, 542 A.2d 900 (1988); Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n
v. Halpern, 181 N.J. Super. 93, 436 A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct. 1981); Unit Owners Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman,
223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982).
Cf. Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084 (Ct. App. 1980); Lion Square Phase II and III Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Hask, 700 P.2d 932 (Colo. App. 1985); Westbridge Condominium Ass'n v. Lawrence, 554 A.2d
1163 (D.C. App. 1989); Thiess v. Island House Ass'n, 311 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Cohn v.
Brodsky, 138 Misc. 2d 1020, 526 N.Y.S.2d 345 (City Ct. 1988); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B.
Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (each invalidating association attempts to alter the initial allocation
of common elements or assessments).
131. A notable exception is Oregon. See Warren v. Del Pizzo, 46 Or. App. 153, 611 P.2d 309, modified on
other grounds, 48 Or. App. 237, 616 P.2d 1186 (1980) (refusing to limit amendments to the declaration by
reasonableness review).
132. 1 do not mean to imply that this coercive aspect of POA governance renders POAs like government or
that it justifies application of public law standards to POAs. Consent-coercion is a continuum, not a duality, and
POAs stand considerably closer on the continuum to most other private organizations than to government.
An important distinction between private coercion and public coercion is that the former usually is easier to
avoid and easier to escape. As noted earlier, supra note 37, most POAs are of very small extent, and their jurisdic-
tion is accordingly easy to avoid and moderately easy to escape.
Another measure of coercion is the degree of centralization of different functions. Most governments control
far more functions than POAs. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Still another measure of coercion is the consequences of disobedience. On the relevant distinctions between
POAs and government, see supra note 40.
For a public law theory that when individuals delegate their power to the sovereign, they pre-emptively "con-
sent" to whatever the sovereign might do, see T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 131-32, 136-37, 187 (E. Oakshott ed. 1962).
This theory still has some force in the public law, despite the influence of Locke, see infra note 147, but is widely
rejected in private law. Infra Part IV. D.
133. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). This is, of course, the underlying purpose of reasonableness review in the
boilerplate deal.
Over the past decade, commentators writing in several discrete substantive areas have noted the courts' ten-
dency to impose "hypothetical bargains" where actual consent is impractical or otherwise absent. See, e.g.,
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chasers at the time of contracting as to the precise way of handling future cir-
cumstances is impossible or undesirable, not merely because of transaction
costs, but also because future circumstances are unknown at the time of
purchase.134 The judicial response, nevertheless, is the same: courts seek to en-
sure that association decisions binding on unit owners and arrived at after those
owners have purchased their units do not disadvantage those owners in any sig-
nificant way.
Thus, the lesson of Drabinsky and similar cases is that in judicially review-
ing a POA decision, the court's inquiry is not into what the unit purchasers
might have foreseen the association as doing, but what those purchasers them-
selves might have done had they foreseen future circumstances. As an organiza-
tion with jurisdiction over all unit owners, the association might be expected to
act on purely majoritarian grounds, for instance, by adopting resolutions that
benefit the majority more than they harm that majority. Alternatively, an asso-
ciation might decide issues based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency,
without otherwise attending to minority losses.' 35 Under either formulation, the
minority of unit owners may be worse off than before adoption of the resolution.
Contracting parties act on the basis not of majority rule, but of unanimity:
if a person does not think a contract will benefit him, that person will not be a
party to the contract. When a court assesses the reasonableness of a new POA
resolution, the court adopts the unanimity principle and upholds the decision
only if it can be integrated into a hypothetical bargain that embodies the sort of
result all association members might have supported had they known of future
circumstances prior to purchasing their units. In other words, a POA decision
must bring about a situation that is Pareto-superior 13 to the situation the unit
owners were in immediately after purchase."a7 In the usual case, a decision is
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 68-69 (1985). Writers on corporate law, in particular, have
examined, elaborated, and applauded the tendency. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 291 (1986); Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. R~v. 919, 951-52 (1988).
134. Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("It would
be impossible to list all restrictive uses in a declaration of condominium. .. [T]he list is endless and subject to
constant modification .... ").
135. The Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency sometimes is called potential Pareto superiority. Under the
Kaldor-Hicks formulation, a change is efficient if, after the gainers compensate the losers, the change is Pareto-
superior. R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 12-13. Outcome A is said to be Pareto-superior to Outcome B if and only if
at least one person is better off under A and nobody is worse off. Id. at 12. A decision will almost never be neutral,
for if the benefits and costs of the decision are precisely in balance, the administrative costs of instituting a change
render the decision inefficient.
136. On the concept of Pareto superiority, see supra note 135.
137. The following example illustrates why the time immediately after purchase is the initial benchmark for
determining whether a particular decision is Pareto-superior and therefore reasonable. Assume a developer subdi-
vides a tract of land into six lots, A, B, C, D, E, and F. Without any covenants at all, each lot is worth $100,000.
If the developer were to impose a covenant limiting all lots to residential purposes, the value of each lot would
change. Posit further that Lots A and B adjoin a public thoroughfare and that the covenant would reduce their
value by $20,000 each while increasing the value of Lots C, D, E, and F by $40,000 each. In these circumstances,
the developer will adopt the covenant, for its net value is positive: an increase in total subdivision value of from
S600,000 to $720,000. The purchasers of Lots A and B will pay only $80,000 each for their lots. Their reduced
purchase prices will compensate them in advance for the depressive effect of the restriction. Cf Ellickson, Alterna-
tives, supra note 19, at 714. See also Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528
S.W.2d 651 (1975) (upholding disproportionate provision in documents of which unit purchaser had notice while
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"unreasonable" if it causes a move away from Pareto optimality."38 A decision
that is efficient but not Pareto-superior can be rendered Pareto-superior by com-
pensating owners who otherwise would suffer net losses.139 If the decision is
efficient, compensation will be necessary only if the decision disproportionately
harms some owners, that is, if it affects their interests in ways in which those
interests are not fungible. For example, if the board of directors levies a special
assessment to raise funds for reconstruction of the clubhouse, all owners are
likely to be affected fairly equally by the decision. The fact that such a decision
is efficient will suffice to demonstrate that it is Pareto-superior and, therefore,
"reasonable." However, if in the course of its mediation function the association
restricts leasing, if in the course of its preservation function it changes parking
rules, or if in the course of its community enhancement function it obstructs a
view, then the association must compensate unit owners who are net losers in
order for the decision to be Pareto-superior and, therefore, "reasonable."
From the foregoing, it is apparent that reasonableness review may be ana-
lyzed as a four-step process. First, the court determines if the decision is effi-
cient.140 If it is not, the decision is unreasonable and inquiry may end. Second,
if the decision is efficient, the court must determine if at the time of adoption
the decision affects all owners approximately equally or if it inflicts dispropor-
tionate harm on some owners. If it affects all owners equally, it is necessarily
Pareto-superior and reasonable. The inquiry may end. Third, if the decision im-
poses disproportionate harm, the court must determine whether the complaining
owners are really net losers. They would not be net losers, for example, if the
decision caused an increase in their units' market value exceeding their losses.
stating that association did not have power to create further disproportionality). This example illustrates the error
in some courts' belief that a covenant scheme is sustainable only if every lot in the subdivision is benefited more
than burdened. See. e.g., Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 58 Cal. App. 3d 506, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1976).
Suppose that the developer establishes a Property Owners Association for the governance of the subdivision,
and after the developer has sold all lots to members of the public, the POA considers adopting a resolution to
permit the establishment of a convenience store on Lot F. The existence of this store would increase the value of
Lot F by $20,000 and increase the value of Lots A, B, C, and D by $15,000 each. But it would diminish the value
of Lot E by $10,000, for Lot E is located near Lot F and would suffer additional traffic and aesthetic losses.
Assuming no other relevant factors (such as those set forth infra Part V. A),. such a decision would meet the
Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, for it would increase the value of the subdivision by the net amount of
$70,000. In the absence of compensation, however, it would not be reasonable, for it does not comply with the
contract unanimity principle. The owner of Lot E would not have paid $140,000 for a lot worth $130,000. The
decision to permit a convenience store on Lot F can be rendered Pareto-superior to the situation immediately
following purchase, and therefore reasonable, by compensating the owner of Lot E.
138. See Ackerman, Introduction, On the Role of Economic Analysis in Law in EcoNosic FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY LAW xii-xiii (B. Ackerman ed. 1975):
Outcome A is defined as Pareto-optimal if it is impossible to move to any other social state without
making at least one person worse off in this new social state than he was under A.... [lIf an existing rule
is not Pareto-optimal then (by definition) it should be possible to devise at least one new rule that is
Pareto-superior to the existing state of legal affairs.
A move away from Pareto optimality will not invariably be unreasonable. The new decision need only be Pareto-
superior to the position of the unit owners immediately after purchase; it need not be Pareto-superior to the
situation immediately prior to adoption of the decision.
139. Professor Ellickson was the first commentator to advocate compensation of disproportionately impacted
units, at least in the context of covenant amendments. His proposal that the courts employ the Michelman stan-
dards of compensability are probably unworkable, however, for the standards likely are unintelligible to most
people, including many judges and lawyers. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4, at 1534-36.
140. The burden of persuasion differs in different kinds of cases. See infra Part V. B.
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Similarly, they would not be net losers if the association, formally or informally,
provided compensation sufficient to prevent anyone from being a net loser. If
there are no net losers, the decision is Pareto-superior and reasonable. Fourth, if
there are uncompensated net losers, the decision is not Pareto-superior. The
court will invalidate the decision or construe it in a way to preserve its
reasonableness.
D. Parallels in Other Areas of Private Law
Judicial employment of a review standard based on Pareto superiority and
the hypothetical bargain is by no means limited to Property Owners Associa-
tions. On the contrary, the standard is employed throughout private law in as-
sessing the "reasonableness" of coercive decisions-that is, decisions to which
there has been no effective consent by the parties affected. In general, if A
manages the collected assets of X, Y, and Z, and if A makes a decision to which
X, Y, and Z have not effectively consented, then that decision will not survive
judicial scrutiny if either X, Y, or Z is a net loser. This is so even if the decision
is economically efficient for X, Y, and Z in the aggregate. In order for an effi-
cient decision that harms X (while helping Y and Z) to pass judicial muster, A
must include some arrangement, formal or informal, to compensate X.
A good illustration may be found in the law of trusts. If a trustee manages
property for the benefit of a life beneficiary and a remainderman, the trustee
may not invest in a way that disproportionately harms one beneficiary, even
though the net result is good for the trust as a whole. If the trustee wishes to
retain the investment, he must compensate the losing beneficiary from the gains
of the winner. Thus, when a trustee purchases a wasting asset with a high cur-
rent income and little future principal, some of the income must be "amor-
tized," or allocated to the remainderman.141 Similar bars to efficient but non-
Pareto-superior actions may be found in the law of corporations, 42 mutual ben-
141. 3A W. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS 184 (4th ed. 1988); cf. id. at 211 (allocating part of the sales
price of property not producing income to life beneficiary).
142. In close corporation cases courts authorize dissolution for oppression of the minority where majority
conduct defeats the minority's reasonable expectations. Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473
N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). Cf. R.
CLARK. CORPORATE LAW 443-58 (1986); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 997-1010 (1983)
(statutory right of appraisal in business corporations, where the dissenting shareholder has the right to be bought
out if he disapproves of certain extraordinary corporate actions). See also Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 133.
An example in a quasi-public context is the monopolist's traditional duty to serve. When the sovereign grants
to an entity the exclusive right to provide a good or service (thereby foreclosing consumer choice by government
coercion), the good or service must be delivered in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner irrespective of considera-
tions of efficiency maximization. On the duty to serve, see generally C. HAAR & D. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF
THE TRACKS (1986). For a survey of the eases and literature of the subject, see C. HAAR & M. WOLF, LAND USE
PLANNING 660-73 (1989).
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:41
efit societies and cooperatives, 43 running land covenants,"" and mineral
interests. 4
I noted earlier that Professor Frug criticized Professor Ellickson for incon-
sistency by proposing that compensation, which Frug characterized as a public
law principle, should be part of the private law of POAs.'" We have seen, how-
ever, that compensation is very much a principle of private law, and was, in
fact, imported into public law from the law applicable to private individuals and
entities. 147 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that compensation should become
part of the law of Property Owners Associations. 4"
V. MEASURING UTILITY UNDER THE EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE
A. Relevant Factors
The first step in determining whether a POA decision is reasonable, that is,
in determining whether it can be integrated into a hypothetical bargain, ordina-
143. In agricultural and other cooperative cases, the courts refuse to enforce bylaw amendments against
members who joined previous to the amendments if such members would suffer disproportionate loss by reason of
the change-even where the members had agreed at the time of joining that they would be bound by future
changes. See, e.g., Whitney v. Farmers' Coop. Grain Co., 110 Neb. 157, 193 N.W. 103 (1923); Lambert v.
Fishermen's Dock Coop., 61 N.J. 596, 297 A.2d 566 (1972). See also Annotation, Co-operative Associations:
Validity and Enforceability of Bylaw Amendment Reducing Benefits Available to Members, 61 A.L.R.3d 976
(1975).
144. One example is the changed conditions doctrine, under which old servitudes survive even if it would be
economically efficient to remove them. They are invalidated only if the dominant estate no longer enjoys any
benefit (other than nuisance value) from them. See Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974);
Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 88 Nev. 200, 495 P.2d 624 (1972); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A.
J. Casner ed. 1952). Cf. Reiehman, Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 158. See also Petersen v. Beekmere,
Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971) (disallowing burden of assessment where it would impose
a disproportionate burden on some owners in violation of contract expectancies); Lakemoor Community Club, Inc.
v. Swanson, 24 Wash. App. 10, 600 P.2d 1022 (1979) (developer could not exercise reserved power to alter the
covenants to impair lot purchasers' contract expectancies, even though lot owner had notice of reservation).
145. The executive right to lease the mineral interest of another cannot be exercised "so as to obtain benefits
for 0 that would not also be shared by A." R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 48 (2d ed. 1983). The
courts in oil-producing states have long struggled with how to interpret a grant of "other minerals" so as to avoid
nonconsensual loss to either the surface owner or the mineral owner. For a review of some of this struggle and the
Texas Supreme Court's decision to employ compensation principles in construing hypothetical bargains, see Moser
v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
146. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 4, at 1591-92.
147. The requirement of compensation for takings by eminent domain was imported into federal law in the
late 18th century but not into most state constitutions until well into the 19th century. M. HORWITz, TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW 63-64 (1977). Professor Horwitz notes beth Blackstone's influence and contemporary
natural law thinking as promoting the trend.
Such natural law thinking invoked what we now call the principle of Pareto superiority to limit government
actions for which there is no effective consent. See MoI'rEsQuIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Ch. 15 ("[W]hen the
public has occasion for the estate of an individual, it ought never to act by the rigour of political law; it is here
that the civil law ought to triumph, who with the eyes of a mother regards every individual as the whole commu-
nity."). See also J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT-SECOND TREATISE (J.W. Gough ed. 1946). Examples of
Pareto-superior standards appear at id. 15, 19, 24-25 (property can become individually owned and thus taken
from the common stock only if no one is harmed). In Locke's model, as in private law generally, the Pareto-
superior standard is no longer applicable where there is effective consent. Id. at 28, 30, 69.
Locke imported these theories of limitation upon the sovereign from compact principles of private law. Id. at
97, 101. Provisions for compensation for governmental takings represented, therefore, an effort to bind the sover-
eign power to the rules already governing private entities.
148. See infra Part VI. B.
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rily will be ascertaining whether it is efficient. In this context, "an 'efficient'
process is one which maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satis-
faction, . . . and not all satisfaction is material." 49 Thus, a POA decision is
"efficient" if utility gains from the decision outweigh utility losses.
Utility gains include both financial and nonfinancial gains. In the POA
context, financial gains are of two kinds: those that are readily capitalized in
increased fair market value of all or some units and those that can be measured
only in other ways. An example of a gain reflected in fair market value is the
gain in the value of most units resulting from a POA decision to restrict unit
leasing.1 50 Examples of other financial gains include higher interest yields on
deposited association funds and savings in common property repair and cleaning
costs. Examples of nonfinancial gains include decreased noise levels, aesthetic
improvements, gains in freedom, and reduction of risk. Nonfinancial gains also
include improvements in community participation and morale.
Utility losses are also of the financial and nonfinancial variety. Some of the
financial losses may be capitalized into effects on fair market value. The same
leasing restriction that increases the fair market value of a majority of the units
may decrease the fair market value of the units currently leased.' 5 ' Other finan-
cial losses are more difficult to capitalize, such as the amount of a special as-
sessment, additional costs for repair and cleaning, settlement costs from pay-
ment of compensation,152 and administrative costs.
Administrative costs can be particularly high when they include the ex-
pense of enforcing a decision against recalcitrant association members. The
level of attorneys' fees authorized in some POA cases, for example, might be
considered low in corporate litigation, but in the association setting the fees
often seem disproportionate to the benefit gained or to the resources of the POA
members who must foot the bill.153 When the administrative costs of a decision
are high, therefore, efficiency considerations might dictate that needed changes
be brought about by negotiation between the POA and affected unit owners
rather than by association fiat. 54
149. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1173 (1967).
150. See, e.g., LeFebvre v. Osterndorf, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 275 N.W.2d 154 (1979). A high number of leased
units (over 30%) can impair significantly the market position of the subdivision. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note
12, at 7.
151. See, e.g., LeFebvre, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 275 N.W.2d 154.
152. "'Settlement costs' are measured by the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources which would be
required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs." Michelman, supra
note 149, at 1214.
153. See, e.g., O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988) (actual POA
attorney fees of $10,000 in dispute with unit owner over cable television; amount does not include sums due
owner's attorney); Chateau Village N. Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1982) (POA
incurred S2400 in attorneys' fees through trial attempting to require owner to remove two cats from unit); Lake
Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n v. Hanauer, 494 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (unit owner awarded attorneys'
fees of over $12,000 in POA's unsuccessful suit for alleged violation of restrictions); Wimbledon Townhouse Con-
dominium I Ass'n v. Kessler, 425 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (fees denied where POA's law firm had
expended over 40 attorney-hours in garage door dispute). Often in POA cases, enforcement of costs and fees is
shifted to the losing party. This does not, however, affect overall utility, except insofar as the expense of shifting
represents an administrative cost.
154. See infra Part VII.
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Nonfinancial losses include reduction in individual and community morale
and participation. Loss of morale may arise from aesthetic deterioration, reduc-
tion of freedom, increase in risk, or preclusion from harboring children or pets.
The findings of recent empirical studies are useful in assessing the relative
utility gains and losses from specific decisions. Some of these findings co-exist
only uncomfortably, if at all, with the ideological convictions of many scholars.
For example, community heterogeneity, which many scholars see as a positive
value, is in fact associated with severe association problems, including rule vio-
lations, assessment delinquencies, and low morale. 155 Scholars tend to place sig-
nificant value on personal freedom, but empirical results, at least from condo-
minium surveys, suggest resident satisfaction with the high degree of regulation
typical of condominiums, especially if that regulation was in place when the
unit owners purchased their units.156 Similarly, some scholars emphasize the
flexibility of the rule alteration power as an important association tool. The em-
pirical studies, however, suggest that the alteration power ought to be employed
sparingly because unit purchasers are risk-adverse-indeed, conservative in the
extreme' 57-and alteration of the existing regulatory scheme is likely to result
in considerable social unrest. 58
155. See, e.g., FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 11, 14-15. Cf. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 24-26
(factors correlating with increase in rule violations included, inter alia, increase in number of renters over last five
years, life cycle heterogeneity, percentage of families with children, and percentage rentals); id. at 14-15 (factors
correlating positively with member participation included, inter alia, fewer rentals, more members under 55, and
homogeneity in age groups); id. at 22, 49 (factors correlating with assessment delinquency included, inter alia,
percent rental and increase in rentals); CAI STUDY, supra note 12, at 27 (high rental rate coincides with high
foreclosure rate); id. at 27-28 (high rental rate coincides with low quorum requirements); V. Walker, supra note
12, at 23 (membership selection devices reduce need to socialize new members).
The positive correlation between community morale, age homogeneity, absence of children, and members
under 55 suggests an error in Congress' decision to limit no-child rules to retirement communities. Fair Housing
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620-23 (1988).
156. For examples of condominium regulation, see supra note 25. In a survey of Florida condominiums, most
residents surveyed disagreed with the statement that neighbors were nosy, most disagreed with the statement that
power was too centralized, most thought apathy was the biggest problem, and most (81.2%) would buy the same
condominium again. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 64-69 (Questions 30, 9, 29, 35). A list of other questions
revealed similarly high levels of satisfaction. Id. (Questions 6, 11, 13, 20, 26, 31, 33).
157. Among the factors rated as "very important" or "important" in a resident's decision to purchase Florida
condominiums were security (85.2%), "rules and regulations which protect my investment and lifestyle" (92.6%),
little or no maintenance work (89.5%), neighbors with similar values and lifestyles (71.7%), and professional
management (67.9%). These indicia of conservativism are comparable to, and sometimes stronger than, more
traditional reasons for buying real estate: price (89.2%), convenience of location (76.2%), recreational opportuni-
ties (76.7%), and quality of investment (74.0%). FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 55-56.
Although the age of the Florida respondents was high, unit purchasers' risk-adversity has been noted in other
contexts. See. e.g., Ellickson, Cities, supra note 4, at 1525; Reichman, Residential, supra note 4, at 285. Cf. V.
Walker, supra note 12, at 28 (economic value of privately owned unit higher in condominium owners" value
hierarchy than group values).
158. See, e.g., FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 19-21, which discusses reactance, a response to a perceived
loss of freedom due to association action. (Reactance is a marketing term.) In POAs its symptoms include demand
for lost freedom, derogation of board of director's legitimacy, and psychological elevation to an exaggerated extent
of the importance of the lost freedom. Of course, sometimes change is a necessary precondition to stability. See
Note, Condominium Rulemaking, supra note 11, at 653.
Empirical results suggest that the POA context is no place to adopt Michelman's social reservation principle:
[W]hen it has been formally declared, or when a tacit understanding has arisen, that society reserves the
right to preempt the exploitation of a certain narrowly described class of resources at any time, and that
no one is to form any inconsistent expectations about the future use and control of those resources.
Michelman, supra note 149, at 1240.
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Generally, the loss of morale attendant upon alteration of the regulatory
scheme becomes more severe as the alteration becomes more intrusive, espe-
cially when the alteration interferes with what Professor Radin calls an individ-
ual's "personhood."' 159 Professor Radin distinguishes "fungible property"--that
which is held only instrumentally and which may be replaced readily with goods
of equal market value-from "personal property," the loss of which results in
pain that is not readily compensable. 160 Professor Radin draws her examples of
personal property principally from residential settings, and presumably she
would classify an interest in a residential POA unit as the "personal property"
of the individual who dwells there. 6 Arguably, many commercial POA units
also qualify as "personal property." Many, if not most, businesses represent
their owners' primary source of self-expression: such businesses are as much or
more a part of their owners' personhood as written product is to a writer or as
family is to a homemaker. Intrusion into real estate that serves as a principal
business location is likely to be met with a resistance far more fierce than one
might predict by examining merely the intrusion's cost in market or instrumen-
tal value.162
Each individual's personhood may be thought of as a dynamic system of
which the physical body is the center, but which extends well beyond the body's
limits.' 63 To state that an item is "property"---or more precisely, to observe that
an individual has a property right in an item-is to observe that the item is
159. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
160. Id. at 960-61.
161. For her comments on the home, see id. at 991-92. For discussion in the POA context, see FLORIDA
STUDY, supra note 12, at 8-Il.
162. Cf Unit Owners Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982). Examples of
such resistance can be seen in the court and political battles individual business people waged during and after
Urban Development Corporation condemnations in Newburgh, New York during the late 1960s and during and
after the Crossroads Mall condemnations in Boulder, Colorado during the 1970s.
The importance of some business property to personhood seems to have passed unnoticed by many scholars,
as is suggested by the economic term "consumer surplus" to describe value beyond market or instrumental value.
Perhaps scholars overlook the personhood aspect of business enterprises because few of them have had en-
trepreneurial experience. Certainly anyone who has been a business owner for a significant length of time is deeply
aware of the profound connection between business expression and personhood.
Professor Radin does discuss the "caricature capitalist," the person who "cannot express her nature without
control over a vast quantity of things and other people." Radin classifies the caricature capitalist as a fetishist.
Radin, supra note 159, at 970. However, this classification represents a moral judgment about values important to
other individuals, and Professor Radin does not support it except by appeal to popular opinion. Moreover, this
classification, even if useful, says nothing about thousands of real, noncaricature capitalists.
163. This is not to imply that one's body cannot be a part of another individual's personhood system as well
as of one's own. Thus, parents have claims on the bodies of their children, spouses on those of their spouses, cf. J.
LOCKE, supra note 147, at 39, and viable unborn children on those of their mothers. Some of these claims are
enforceable in rem in varying degrees. When the state gives a private individual an unlimited or very wide claim
on the body of another, the condition is slavery.
Under the personhood-as-system formulation, body parts in situ are personal property. Professor Radin leans
against so classifying them, relying on "intuition." Radin, supra note 159, at 966.
Yet Radin's "intuition" is far from universal; among those not sharing it are Locke, the judges of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, and this writer. See J. LOCKE, supra note 147, at 15 ("[Ylet every man has a property in his
own person; this nobody has any rights to but himself."); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d
1405, 249 Cal. Rptr, 494 (1988). 1 believe the most satisfactory formulation is to identify body parts in situ or
removed but kept for sentimental reasons as (to employ Radin's terminology) "personal property"; other parts
permanently removed but not abandoned as "fungible property"; and abandoned body parts as res nullius or,
alternatively, part of the real estate where located.
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within that system.'" To state, in Professor Radin's terminology, that it is "fun-
gible" property is to observe that it may be removed and replaced without sys-
temic disruption; to state that it is "personal property" is to observe that inter-
ference with it necessarily causes systemic disruption. The symptoms of
systemic disruption are physical damage, loss of morale, or both. Because indi-
viduals incorporate unique territories-particular locations-into their systems,
loss of morale is often the result of territorial invasion. 5 This is why the courts
in public takings cases, have been especially solicitous of the integrity of indi-
vidually owned territory."" Courts reviewing POA decisions on reasonableness
grounds also seek to protect against gross interference with the personhood sys-
tem. They too have been notably solicitous of individually owned territory."6 "
164. A more precise formulation of this private law principle would be as follows: To state that an item is
Chauncey's "property" is to state either that it is within Chauncey's "system" and did not leave the system of
another without that other's actual or constructive consent or that it has left Chauncey's system without
Chauncey's actual or constructive consent. (By constructive consent, I mean to cover hypothetical bargain situa-
tions.) Thus, Chauncey's lost or stolen property, which is outside his system without his consent, remains his
property. If Chauncey abandons an item, however, he places it outside his system by consent, and the item be-
comes the property of the first person to make it his own. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 79 (2d ed. 1988).
The careful reader may respond that private law recognizes a number of instances in which rights and obliga-
tions (property) appear to shift among suijuHs persons without apparent consent. Examples include estoppel and
adverse possession, the former said to be based on "fairness" and the latter in part on public policy (efficiency).
Although this is not the place to argue the matter in detail, I doubt that these or analogous doctrines (such as
acquiescence, waiver, and laches) are really exceptions to the consent rule. I suspect that they are the products of
judicial investigation into the way real people, acting in the real world, tacitly consent to the transfer of rights and
obligations-even if those real people later change their minds. Practitioners of private law, who encounter many
questions regarding intent and almost none (after law school) regarding policy, would probably agree.
As the foregoing suggests, I am increasingly persuaded that much of the language of public welfare in private
law cases is deceptive-that judicial conclusions regarding efficiency, when not merely dicta, elucidate the impact
of conduct on the parties, and are therefore probative of what they did agree to or could have agreed to. See, e.g.,
Humble Oil & Gas Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974) (purporting to employ public policy in struc-
turing mutually beneficial hypothetical bargain). Efficiency, in other words, is primarily a tool for determining the
scope of actual consent or the structure of the hypothetical bargain and, as the text indicates, is readily discarded
as a controlling principle when it clashes with more convincing evidence on the subject.
165. Government is especially likely to compensate for "the stark spectacle of an alien, uninvited presence in
one's territory." Michelman, supra note 149, at 1228.
166. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
167. E.g., Drabinsky v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 239 N.Y. 321, 146 N.E. 614 (1925). See also Chateau Village N.
Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1982) (voiding board anti-pet decision); Winston Towers
200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (voiding rule against pets in unit on ground that
rule was retroactive); Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975) (voiding rule against pets in unit
based on narrow interpretation of statute); Board of Managers of Village House (A Condominium) v. Frazier, 81
A.D.2d 760, 439 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1981) (construing antileasing rule narrowly to permit overnight guests in unit);
Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977) (POA right to regu-
late parking ended at lot line). The courts take a more indulgent attitude toward intrusive rules of which purchas-
ers had notice upon purchase. As noted above, such rules are not subject to reasonableness review. See, e.g.,
Cohan v. Riverside Park Place Condominium Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (inspection of unit);
River Terrace Condominium Ass'n v. Lewis, 33 Ohio App. 3d 52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986) (fumigation of unit);
Preston Towers Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (antichild rule). Cf.
Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (age restrictions
bifurcated; part in existence when defendant moved in enforced, but amendment not enforced).
The approach of protecting the personhood system, especially within the POA unit, may be in accord with the
expectations of most unit purchasers, who, as former fee owners and tenants, are accustomed to the notion of
having exclusive possession. Cf. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 8-10.
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B. Judicial Review of POA Utility Determinations
The courts have adopted several methods of reviewing association determi-
nations of utility. One method is to examine a board determination upon an
evidentiary standard similar to that which might be applied if an appellate
court were reviewing the decision of a finder of fact; if there is any inferable
evidence for the determination, it is sustained.'68 A second method of review is
the hearing de novo. This is the trial judge's procedure in a significant group of
reported cases.'6 9 The burden of persuasion generally is placed upon the associ-
ation: the POA must demonstrate that its decision is supported by the evidence.
A third method, often employed in conjunction with either of the first two, is for
the court to examine the process the POA undertook in arriving at its decision.
If the process is deemed adequate, the decision is likely to be upheld. 70 This
third method is analogous to the "informed consent" condition to immunity
under the business judgment rule. One must hasten to add, however, that not all
POA cases reciting the business judgment rule have considered process to be
relevant,17' and not all cases in which process was deemed relevant were cases
in which the court recited the business judgment rule.' 72
With nearly perfect regularity, the courts have adopted the first method
(minimal review) in cases in which the association is administering its common
property or common finances and have adopted the second method (de novo
review) when the association is limiting the use of individually owned prop-
erty. 3 The third method, procedural review, is employed to examine associa-
tion financial dealings, usually in conjunction with a minimal evidence standard.
168. Farrington v. Casa Solana Condominium Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Hidden
Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); River Terrace Condominium Ass'n v.
Lewis, 33 Ohio App. 3d 52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986); San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
169. See O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988); Ironwood Owners
Ass'n IX v. Soloman, 178 Cal. App. 3d 766, 224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1986); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger,
119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981); Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Yorkshire Village Community Ass'n
v. Sweasy, 170 III. App. 3d 155, 524 N.E.2d 237 (1988); Cohan v. Riverside Park Place Condominium Ass'n, 333
N.W.2d 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Courts at Beachgate v. Bird, 226 N.J. Super. 631, 545 A.2d 243 (Ch. Div.
1988). Cf. Smith v. Butler Mtn. Estates Property Owners Ass'n, 90 N.C. App. 40, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988), aff d,
324 N.C. 80, 375 S.E.2d 905 (1989) (trial court could adopt independent basis for upholding POA decision even
if POA did not adopt that basis).
170. See Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n v. Halpern, 181 N.J. Super. 93, 436 A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct.
1981) (process inadequate); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch.Div.
1979) (process adequate); San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (process adequate).
171. Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
172. Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977).
173. The one significant exception to date is River Terrace Condominium Ass'n v. Lewis, 33 Ohio App. 3d
52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986), in which the court specifically disclaimed the power of de novo review of a POA
decision to enter a unit to exterminate cockroaches. However, the decision was so clearly within the power of the
association, whose governing documents specifically gave it rights of access for maintenance purposes, that the real
wonder is why the court consumed well over 3000 words (including nine dense footnotes) to dispose of the matter.
Even in this case the trial court had held a full evidentiary hearing on the merits.
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Occasionally it is utilized to heighten the de novo review employed when the
POA regulates individually owned units.174
De novo and procedural review can be justified only if their benefits exceed
their cost. In cases involving POA regulation of individual units de novo review
serves the purposes of protecting the territorial and liberty expectancies of indi-
vidual owners and of reducing opportunities for oppression. When the associa-
tion permits a new use, compensation for neighbors adversely affected might be
a cheaper and fairer substitute for de novo review. 175 When the association pro-
hibits a proposed new use, compensation of the restricted owner is not a viable
alternative to de novo review, for the association may maintain that because it
was merely preserving the status quo under pre-existing documentation, no
compensation is needed. In the latter case the court probably will not be able to
avoid the cost of a full evidentiary hearing, so it would gain little by avoiding
the de novo standard.
Procedural review has attracted recent attention in the business corporation
setting due to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 1 6 but the judiciary was applying it in the POA setting well before
Van Gorkom. A judge's goal in applying procedural review is to ensure that the
POA decisionmakers undertook a responsible investigation before imposing ex-
penses or other burdens on their fellow unit owners. Proper procedures tend to
demonstrate that the decisionmakers acted in good faith and on an informed
basis. In the course of procedural review judges have considered whether the
decisionmakers kept records to substantiate the alleged problem they were try-
ing to solve,1 77 whether they notified and consulted other unit owners on the
impending decision,' 78 whether they evaluated alternatives,'179 whether they con-
sulted legal counsel'80 or other experts,' 81 whether a special committee met to
assess the issue, 8 2 and whether they thoroughly discussed the issue among
themselves.' 83 Of course, not all of these steps are deemed necessary for every
174. See Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 169 III. App. 3d 1059,
523 N.E.2d 1245 (1988) (litigation costs); The Courts at Beachgate v. Bird, 226 N.J. Super. 631, 545 A.2d 243
(Ch. Div. 1988) (structural modification of unit); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516,
401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979) (special assessment); Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n v. Halpern, 181 N.J.
Super. 93, 436 A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct. 1981) (security deposit for landlords); San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners
Ass'n v. Miller, 761 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (special assessment).
175. Cf. Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983) (POA
approval of architectural change not provided for in bylaws is proper basis for cause of action against the associa-
tion). Court costs can be avoided by the use of mediation devices. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
176. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
177. Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n v. Halpern, 181 N.J. Super. 93, 436 A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct. 1981).
178. Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977).
179. The Courts at Beachgate v. Bird, 226 N.J. Super. 631, 545 A.2d 243 (Ch. Div. 1988); Papalexiou v.
Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
180. Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
181. San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
182. Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 169 III. App. 3d 1059, 523
N.E.2d 1245 (1988).
183. Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979); Holleman
v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977).
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determination; the magnitude and complexity of each decision suggest the scope
of preparation required.8 4
Commentators have questioned the efficiency of procedural review of board
actions in the context of for-profit corporations. Professors Macey and Miller
argue, for example, that "in general the increased 'papering' of board decisions
will not substantially raise the level of deliberations ...because of the ease
with which corporate boards, aided by a phalanx of sophisticated lawyers and
investment bankers, can cloak result-oriented decision-making in the guise of
careful deliberation.118 5 This argument is based in part upon the long business
experience of many corporate directors (a combined total of 121 years in Van
Gorkom), the speed with which many corporate decisions must be made, and
the ultimate shifting of knowledge acquisition costs to the shareholders when
outside firms make offers based on information they acquire themselves. 88
Whatever the weight of these drawbacks as applied to business corporations,
they have little weight in the POA context, in which the time pressure imposed
by the business world is almost unknown, information costs are low, the associa-
tion may control the bidding procedure, and decisions are made by association
officials with short tenures and little or no business experience.'87
Although procedural review is more expensive than the minimal eviden-
tiary standard alone, it is likely less expensive than a hearing de novo. Without
looking beyond documentary evidence, a court may be able to determine
whether the decisionmakers consulted experts, conducted meetings, solicited
bids, and undertook other preparatory investigation. Procedural review is there-
fore likely to be efficient in POA cases. Unless the decision has imposed dispro-
portionate harm on particular owners, procedural investigation coupled with a
minimal evidentiary standard should be sufficient to determine if the decision is
reasonable.
VI. MEASURING HARM UNDER THE UNANIMITY AND COMPENSATION
PRINCIPLES
A. Efficient Decisions in Which There Are No Net Losers
Once a court determines that a decision is efficient, the court must ascer-
tain whether at the time of adoption the decision harmed some unit owners
disproportionately. Disproportionate harm to a complaining member is calcu-
lated by identifying the impact on that member of the same factors, financial
and nonfinancial, that are considered in determining the decision's overall
efficiency.' 88
184. Natelson, Fiduciary, supra note 11, at 447-49.
185. Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE LJ. 127, 139-41 (1988).
186. Id. at 142.
187. Natelson, Fiduciary, supra note 11, at 445-46. Since that article appeared, the inexperience and limited
knowledge of most POA board members has been documented empirically. See CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note
12, at 12. The median length of service on a POA board is two years. Id. at 29.
188. See supra Part V. A.
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Some kinds of harm are inherently proportionate. A special assessment al-
located according to the assessment-payment percentages set forth in the POA's
governing documents is not disproportionate, even if the percentages in the gov-
erning documents are unequal. When a POA levies an assessment according to
those percentages, a court that finds the decision efficient routinely sustains the
levy without further inquiry. 89
Because the POA's mediation function involves reconciling the interests of
different unit owners, disproportionate effects are more likely to occur when the
association exercises that function than when it exercises the preservation and
community enhancement functions. A decision permitting one unit owner to
erect a large antenna, for example, may inhibit another unit owner's pristine
view. Yet many mediation decisions are without disproportionate effects. In Du-
laney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey,9 ° for example, a married couple
purchased a condominium apartment and moved in. They brought their pet
poodle with them. Some time later, the board of directors adopted a rule limit-
ing each owner to one dog or cat and exempting all current pets from the rule.
At the time this regulation was adopted it had no effect on the couple, but when
they acquired a second dog, the association was able to convince the court,
purely on efficiency grounds, to enforce the rule. 9 '
If the court finds that a decision does impose disproportionate harm, the
court must determine whether the complaining owners are net losers. If the
decision affords them benefits that outweigh their injury, the regulation is en-
forced without compensation. Cases of this nature generally involve "harm" so
trivial as to cause the reader to wonder why the matter was ever litigated.' 9' An
excellent example is Rywalt v. Writer Corp.,'9 ' in which a Colorado appellate
panel upheld an association decision to construct a second tennis court despite
complaints from two owners that the tennis court would reduce the quality of
their view and their ease of access to other common areas. The loss must have
been de minimis, for these owners were unable to demonstrate sufficient harm
to support injunctive relief, although the trial judge decided for them on other
grounds. On appeal, the complaint was dismissed. Any harm the owners suf-
fered was outweighed by their aliquot portion of the benefits of the the new
tennis court, a facility that the developer had agreed to finance and that would
cost the association nothing. Cases such as Rywalt suggest that the dispropor-
189. E.g., Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979); San
Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
190. 46 Md. App. 464, 418 A.2d 1233 (1980).
191. Id. at 466, 418 A.2d at 1235 (citing need for "harmonious residential atmosphere" and odors, noise,
health hazards, and cleaning and maintenance problems caused by pets).
192. In some cases, injury too trivial to justify suit otherwise will be adjudicated because it is part of a larger
case, or because the parties have become polarized. The latter phenomenon is extremely common in POAs. See
CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 16 (harassment of POA officials); FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 34-36
(complaints to state agency); R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 114-15, 438 (harassment by officials).
On the need in the public law context to take into account the benefits of a regulation upon a complaining
individual in order to determine whether there has been a compensable net loss, see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
193. 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
[Vol. 51:41
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
tionate impact, if any, of a wide range of common property administrative deci-
sions is so minimal that it can be safely ignored.194
B. Compensating When There Are Net Losers
In many instances, an efficient association decision disproportionately
harms a complaining unit owner to such an extent that the injury he suffers
exceeds the benefit accruing to him. In that event, the decision is not Pareto-
superior and will not survive reasonableness review. However, the decision can
be rendered Pareto-superior by the adoption of formal or informal compensation
arrangements. For purposes of illustration, if a new rule requiring removal of
pets entails only one gain, increase in market value, and only one injury, loss of
morale, then the rule is reasonable if (a) the increase in market value exceeds
loss of morale for all pet owners, or (b) the association can and does adequately
compensate any unit owner for whom loss of morale exceeds increase in market
value.
Besides preserving Pareto superiority, compensation arrangements help to
ensure that association decisions actually are efficient, for if benefited owners
know they must compensate burdened owners, benefited owners will take more
care to arrive at only wealth-enhancing decisions. 95 In addition, compensation
eliminates Professor Michelman's demoralization costs:
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers
and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is of-
fered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting
either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompen-
sated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that
they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion. 9
According to Professor Michelman, compensation should be necessary only
when failure to compensate would be "critically demoralizing," that is, when
demoralization costs from failing to compensate exceed settlement costs from
compensating. Nevertheless, it would be a rare POA case in which the settle-
ment costs of compensating for significant disproportionate damage would ex-
ceed demoralization costs. POA settlement costs are low, for injured owners
usually are few and readily identifiable. But community morale is at a pre-
194. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the most
cited of all reasonableness review cases. The parties in Hidden Harbour battled to the appellate level on the
capital issue of whether a condominium board of directors could prohibit alcoholic beverages in the association
clubhouse. The Florida court that sustained the rule noted that such restrictions were very common; presumably
the court's point was that they served a useful purpose whose benefits to the complaining parties outweighed any
harm to the complaining parties. Arguably, also, protection of the POA's general power to regulate the clubhouse
benefited the complaining parties more than the challenged exercise harmed them. Of course, if the restriction had
been applied throughout all common areas or in individual units, the result might have been different.
195. "Thus, it would appear that any measure which society cannot afford or, putting it another way, is
unwilling to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot afford at all." Michelman, supra note
149, at 1181. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
196. Michelman, supra note 149, at 1214 (footnotes omitted). In a POA demoralization cost would be re-'
flected in, inter alia, poor owner participation, poor property maintenance, and high rule violation rates. See, e.g.,
CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 13-16, 23-26.
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mium: the POA relies heavily on unpaid, part-time officials and on voluntary
compliance.197 The latter is especially important because association rule en-
forcement mechanisms are inefficient, expensive, and slow. Moreover, POA re-
distribution decisions do not have the legitimacy granted to government redistri-
bution policies. 19 8
As a preparatory basis for examining how the POA compensation principle
works, it is helpful to review Calabresi and Melamed's formulation of the alter-
natives available to a court when it considers how to respond to conflicting land
uses.' 99 In the context of a disputed POA regulation banning a particular use,
these alternatives may be stated as follows: First, the court may specifically
enforce the regulation without awarding compensation to the unit owner (un-
conditional specific relief). Second, it may permit the unit owner to continue the
use, but require him to pay compensation to the association (money damages or
conditional immunity). Third, the court may refuse to enforce the regulation in
any respect (unconditional immunity). Fourth, it may specifically enforce the
rule on the condition that the association pays compensation to the unit owner
(conditional specific relief).200
The first and third alternatives, unconditional specific relief and uncondi-
tional immunity, theoretically leave the losing party with the option of purchas-
ing the entitlement of the winner. If the losing party elects to do so, the effect is
to permit him to enjoy his land use preferences while paying negotiated com-
pensation. According to the Coase Theorem,1°1 in a world without transaction
costs the losing party would purchase the winner's entitlement if the losing
party's preferred state of affairs were more valuable to him than the entitlement
was to the winner. Such a purchase would establish that the losing party's state
of affairs is more economically efficient. In the second and fourth alternatives,
conditional immunity and conditional specific relief, the court bestows an enti-
tlement, but conditions it upon the payment of compensation. It also fixes the
amount of compensation. If the party with the less efficient preference is or-
dered to pay compensation, that party will yield his preference rather than con-
tinue it at the court-ordered cost.
197. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 12-13.
198. Cf Michelman, supra note 149, at 1181. Because POAs are not granted power to redistribute for egali-
tarian purposes, critical demoralization is more likely to occur from redistributive POA decisions than from redis-
tributive governmental decisions. A governmental redistribution decision often is socially acceptable because "its
evident purpose is to redistribute from the better off to the worse off." Id. at 1182.
199. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 133, at 1115-24. 1 have avoided Calabresi and Melamed's terms for
specific and substitutionary relief ("property rules" and "liability rules"), not seeing what advantage they offer to
offset the confusion they may engender. The terms "conditional immunity" and "conditional specific relief" are
my own.
200. See, e.g., Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
201. The Coase theorem states that "if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right
will not determine the ultimate use of the property." R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 7. Under this theory, if it is
more efficient to eliminate pets from the subdivision than to keep them and a rule against pets is invalidated, the
POA will purchase the acquiescience of pet owners. If it is not more efficient to eliminate pets from the subdivi-
sion than to keep them, the POA will not bother.
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If a court were operating from a purely utilitarian standpoint, then it
would bestow the entitlement exclusively on efficiency grounds. 22 Assume that
Rebecca leases her unit to a tenant in violation of a POA antileasing rule. If it
is more socially efficient for Rebecca to lease, the court ought to grant her im-
munity, either absolute (third alternative) or conditional upon payment of com-
pensation to the association (second alternative). If it is more efficient to enforce
the antileasing rule, the court ought to grant the POA specific relief, either
absolute (first alternative) or conditional on payment of compensation (fourth
alternative).
Once a utilitarian court chooses between specific relief and immunity, it
must determine whether the remedy should be absolute or conditional on pay-
ment of compensation. If damages would be difficult to quantify or negotiation
would not involve prohibitive transaction costs, then ceteris paribus specific re-
lief or immunity ought to be unconditional. If damages are capable of calcula-
tion or negotiation would be overly expensive, then ceteris paribus the court
should fix an amount of compensation.
As already suggested,20 3 the results of the "consent" cases-those in which
a purchaser acquired a unit while accepting a pre-existing decision-are easy to
explain on utilitarian or efficiency principles. In each of these cases there is little
question as to which result is efficient. As between the complaining unit owners
and all of their satisfied neighbors, the unit owners are the least cost avoiders,
for they knew (or easily could have known) of the pre-existing situation and
could have elected to buy elsewhere. Their neighbors also knew of the pre-ex-
isting situation and in many instances relied upon it.204 Thus, in nearly all of the
consent cases the courts have granted the entitlement to the association.
In selecting between absolute specific relief and specific relief conditional
on compensation, courts hearing "consent" cases almost invariably grant uncon-
ditional specific relief. Compensation might be difficult to calculate, and it
would damage community morale by rewarding people for having disregarded
known rules. Another alternative-granting the POA only money damages-is
never selected. It also would involve problems of calculation 05 and loss of mo-
rale in an atmosphere in which equal application of the rules approximates a
moralism.2 °6
202. Recall that under the Michelman formulation, not all efficiency is material. See supra note 149 and
accompanying text. Social efficiency must be calculated by considering such items as general happiness, settled
precedent, and predictability, as well as financial benefits.
203. See supra text following note I11.
204. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
205. The most likely error is on the side of undercompensation--compensating the other POA members for
current losses rather than the complete losses they suffered from misplaced reliance on documents that purported
to prohibit the use. If the damages were not undercompensatory, they would have the effect of eliminating the use,
because it is inefficient in the larger scheme of things.
206. White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). One empirical study of POAs
found an inverse correlation between rule violation and community participation. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note
12, at 23-24, 50. Common sense might suggest that a decrease in community morale of the kind that reduces
participation would increase rule violations, if only because participation leads to better communication of the
rules. Dr. Walker reports an inverse correlation between officer-member communication and rule violation. Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 97.
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If perchance the nonconforming owner wished to buy the entitlement and
the association agreed, transaction costs would be low. There is only one associ-
ation; its unified nature precludes holdout problems. There usually are few vio-
lators, and therefore few potential free riders; if there are many violators the
reason usually is that the association has not been diligent, in which event the
court denies injunctive relief.207
We have seen that the association receives unconditional specific relief
when it seeks to enforce decisions to which individual unit owners have not con-
sented, but which benefit the owners at least as much as they harm them.20 If
the harm outweighs the benefit to owners who are disproportionately affected,
unconditional specific relief is no longer an option, and it is never granted.
When POA action has the potential of inflicting disproportionate loss on
some unit owners, there are several ways, both judicial and extra-judicial, of
accomplishing at least some of the association's goals while preserving Pareto
superiority. An extra-judicial method is for the association to adopt regulations
with loopholes sufficient to avoid the most serious kind of unit owner damage in
the hope of establishing a situation in which each unit owner's benefits exceed
his losses. 09 A related judicial method is to construe a regulation narrowly to
preserve some of its purpose while avoiding particularly harmful results.210
When associations cannot flatly prohibit an activity without inflicting dis-
proportionate harm, they often draft their regulations to permit the activity,
while requiring unit owners engaging in it to compensate the association for
harmful externalities. This is a nonjudicial equivalent of Calabresi and Me-
lamed's second alternative, conditional immunity (substitutionary relief). The
approach is common in leasing restrictions,21' and it has not been challenged
207. White Egret, 379 So. 2d 346. This is the waiver, estoppel, or selective enforcement doctrine. It is possi-
ble to justify this doctrine on economic grounds because past nonenforcement tends to show that the cost of
offending behavior is lower for the POA than the cost of stopping it would be for the unit owner. Moreover, when
there are many violators their organization costs are higher than those of the POA. Ceteris paribus, efficiency
dictates imposing an injunction on the party with lower organization costs or (what is much the same thing)
granting unconditional immunity to the party with higher organization costs. Alternatively, this doctrine may
reflect no more than judicial recognition of transfer of rights by consent. See supra note 164.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
209. E.g., Seagate Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (permitting
hardship leases); Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (permitting
leasing once during period of ownership); Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 418
A.2d 1233 (1980) (present pet population excepted from rule); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty,
685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (babies in early gestation at time of purchase excepted from antichild rule).
See also CAI STUDY, supra note 12, at 33-35 (some.condominiums prohibited renting except for hardship or for
one time during period of ownership).
210. Board of Managers of Village House (A Condominium) v. Frazier, 81 A.D.2d 760, 439 N.Y.S.2d 360
(1981) (construing antileasing rule to permit guests); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d
632 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977) (construing antiparking rule so as to permit parking on individually owned portion
of driveway). Cf. Bush Terrace Homeowners Ass'n v. Ridgeway, 437 N.W.2d 765 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding
that association had exceeded scope of architectural rule in ordering removal of screens used to keep out wasps,
when unit owner had severe allergies).
211. One study found leasing amendments to be the most common substantive bylaw change. CAI STUDY,
supra note 12, at 23. This study identified the percentage of condominiums with different kinds of restrictions.
Only 1.1 % of condominiums totally prohibited leasing. Among the restrictions employed to reduce leasing exter-
nalities or compensate the POA for them were the following: Board must approve tenants (20.7%); board must
approve leases (30.4%); leases must contain certain clauses (34.4%); leases must be in writing (42.7%); leases
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very frequently. There is only one reported case in which such a regulation was
adopted after. the complaining owner's purchase."12 The regulation in question
would have required landlords to provide the POA with a security deposit to
compensate for tenant damage. The court invalidated the rule, apparently con-
cluding that the association had not proven that there was much tenant damage;
better proof might have yielded a different result.2 13
Still another option for preventing disproportionate harm is Calabresi and
Melamed's fourth alternative-injunction coupled with compensation to the
member. This result usually is accomplished by a combination of association
ingenuity and judicial cooperation. An interesting illustration appears in a re-
cent Alaska case.214 The association board of directors had- removed all roof
antennas in order to eliminate leaks and to improve aesthetics and unit market-
ability. The O'Bucks, inveterate television watchers and owners of four televi-
sion sets, sued to have their antenna replaced. They lost, however, because the
association had compensated them in a number of ways. It had paid the
O'Bucks for the value of the antenna it removed, it had installed a new cable
system that provided them with the same or similar programming, and it had
offered to pay their fee for hooking into the new system. The O'Bucks' only
uncompensated cost was a small monthly charge that was more than equaled by
the improvement in marketability of each unit.2"5
VII. PROTECTION OF PERSONHOOD INTERESTS
When enforcement of a nonconsensual POA decision would cause substan-
tial loss of morale to an owner by intruding into the personhood system, the
decision cannot be integrated into a hypothetical bargain, and a court grants
complete immunity to the owner. As noted earlier, a POA usually threatens to
invade the personhood system by adopting a decision designed to intrude into an
owner's control over his individual territory.2"6 Drabinsky v. Sea Gate Associa-
tion,217 discussed earlier, may serve as an example. Had the limit of ten guests
per day been upheld, the association would have effectively regulated not merely
the common streets, but Mr. Drabinsky's domestic life as well. Similar consid-
must have a minimum term (37.2%); owners must notify association of the name of the tenant (64.8 %); one time
fee (23.4%); monthly fee (5.9%); tenant rule violation is a default in the lease (67.9%). Id. at 33-35.
212. Coventry Square Condominium Ass'n v. Halpern, 181 N.J. Super. 93, 436 A.2d 580 (Dist. Ct. 1981).
213. This case is criticized in R. NATELSON, supra note 6, at 159-60. Both increased rule violation and
assessment delinquency correlate empirically with percentage of units leased and with percentage increase in units
leased. CALIFORNIA STUDY, supra note 12, at 22, 24-26, 49. If the finding of no damage is accepted, the case
merely reflects the judicial pelicy against POA redistribution. Cf Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, 110
N.J. 650, 542 A.2d 900 (1988).
214. O'Buck v. Cottonwood Village Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988).
215. See also Juno by the Sea N. Condominium Ass'n (The Towers) v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d 297, 305
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (on rehearing) (scheme of limited common element maintenance provided effective
compensation for allocation of parking units to all owners); Board of Managers of Village House (A Condomin-
ium) v. Frazier, 81 A.D.2d 360, 439 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1981) (sustaining board rejection of a prospective tenant or
purchaser when the operative documents provide for an association buyout or right of first refusal).
216. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
217. 239 N.Y. 321, 146 N.E. 614 (1925).
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erations have induced the courts to strike down pet and child restrictions that
otherwise seem quite reasonable.218
Although the courts sometimes grant complete immunity when the unit
owner's disproportionate loss is "fungible," ' 19 the potential for significant loss of
morale is usually what induces the judiciary to bestow complete immunity.
Often the projected gain from a pet restriction is speculative, while the potential
demoralization of unit owners can be substantial and difficult for a court to
quantify. Often, too, the POA can obtain a desired result, such as the silencing
of an obnoxious dog, by methods short of promulgating a general rule.22
When a POA desires to adopt an efficient rule that might impose substan-
tial unquantifiable losses on a minority, the POA should seek to negotiate with
members of the minority to arrive at a price for their cooperation. Empirical
results suggest that it would be helpful to utilize mediation services during the
negotiations.221 If the measure is truly efficient, the association should be able to
afford the negotiated prices.
There remains the problem of transaction costs. Negotiations might be
time-consuming and expensive. However, the time and cost of negotiating with
dissident owners is unlikely to match the time and cost of obtaining judicial
enforcement. The expense of suing recalcitrant members may prove to be high
enough to eliminate any utility gains from enforcement of the decision. 22
One reason generally given for granting specific instead of substitutionary
relief is that within the context considered, negotiation would be inexpensive. In
the POA context, negotiation costs are indeed lower than in many other situa-
tions. As a single entity with the power to assess its members for the costs of its
operations, the POA has low organization costs and few, if any, free riders. The
number of nonconforming members is usually relatively low; otherwise, a rule
against their use would not be efficient. There is the risk that some of them will
hold out-will refuse to negotiate for any reasonable price. However, holdouts
are eliminated as they die or move, and each POA decision adopted during their
terms of ownership is enforceable against their transferees. Moreover, recent
empirical findings suggest that scholars may have exaggerated the problem of
218. Chateau Village N. Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1982) (board sought to
prevent additional pets; policy struck down as unreasonable); Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d
470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (rule against additional pets invalidated as retroactive); Johnson v. Keith, 368
Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975) (antipet rule of which purchaser knew invalidated on interpretation of ambigu-
ous statute). Cf. Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(invalidating amendment to antichild rule as retroactive).
219. E.g., Monell v. Golfview Road Ass'n, 359 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (immunity from interfer-
ence with access easement); Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730 (N.D. 1981) (immunity from leasing
restriction). The term "fungible" is used here as Professor Radin employs it. See Radin, supra note 159.
220. Dr. Walker tells the story of a dog that was silenced when its owner acquired another dog to keep the
first one company. She suggests fines on owners of troublesome animals (arguably a form of substitutionary relief
for the POA) as an effective device for inducing the owners to solve the problem. Telephone Interview, supra note
97.
221. Arbitration rather than mediation would recreate the problem of quantifying the unit owner's loss. In
this sphere, quantification is best performed by the parties themselves. An empirical study has revealed great
owner receptivity to both arbitration and mediation of condominium disputes, with slightly higher receptivity to
mediation. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 12, at 63.
222. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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holdouts, at least in some contexts. One study found that the Coase Theorem is
substantially.valid for groups of considerable size-that even under conditions
of imperfect knowledge, efficient results are negotiated in groups of up to thirty-
eight members more than ninety percent of the time.223 This study suggests that
negotiations may be feasible when there are thirty-eight or fewer dissident
owners.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the courts' emphasis upon consent as the basis of POA decision-
making power, empirical research and case fact patterns strongly suggest that
POA decisionmaking can be coercive as well as consensual. To a considerable
extent, the courts accurately assess this reality. The courts have forged rules of
judicial review that reflect the interaction of empirical reality with certain lib-
eral values. These values include individual preference, individual autonomy,
and overall efficiency, at least to the extent that efficiency does not conflict with
individual preference and automony.
When a complaining unit owner has approved an association decision by an
act of effective consent, a court generally enforces the decision without inquiry
into its reasonableness. When the complaining unit owner has not effectively
consented, a court constructs a hypothetical bargain, that is, it substitutes the
rules of constructive consent called reasonableness review. Reasonableness re-
view is informed by the same efficiency, unanimity, and compensation principles
that inform certain other areas of private law in situations in which genuine
consent is not practicable.
A court denominates an association decision as reasonable if the decision is
efficient and if it does not impose a net loss on the complaining unit owners. A
decision is efficient if it creates greater utility gains than utility losses for the
association membership in the aggregate. Courts calculate utility gains and
losses by considering a wide range of financial and nonfinancial factors, includ-
ing gains and losses of morale. A decision causes a net loss upon complaining
unit owners if, immediately after the decision's enforcement, it inflicts upon
those owners greater utility losses than utility gains. In the calculation of net
loss and gain, the courts take into account the same factors that they employ in
determining efficiency.
In some cases, primarily those involving common property and common
finances, the courts tend to defer to an association's judgment of efficiency. In
other cases, primarily those affecting individually owned units, the association
carries the burden of persuading a court that it has acted efficiently. If a court
223. See Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15
J. LEGAL STUD, 149, 151 (1986): "Overall, 93 percent of the decisions were efficient and there was no deteriora-
tion as the bargaining groups got larger. If anything, efficiency improved with larger groups . . .. Virtually 100
percent of the full-information bargains were efficient, but efficiency was closer to 90 percent with limited infor-
mation." The authors provide several implications from their results. One is that when a judge or a legislator is
considering choosing a rule to govern a dispute in a situation in which there are as many as 38 parties, he "should
assume that the parties can and will exhaust the gains from trade by voluntary agreement. One who would show
that bargaining breakdown is likely must bear the burden of proof." Id.
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finds that a decision is efficient but that the decision harms the complaining
owners disproportionately, the court must determine whether those owners have
suffered a net loss from the decision. If there is no net loss, the decision is
reasonable. If there is a net loss, the decision is sustained only if adjustments
can or have been made to preserve the decision's Pareto superiority. Those ad-
justments are effected by judicial construction and schemes of formal or infor-
mal compensation.
If the complaining owners have suffered net loss and the association has
refused to compensate them or if compensation is impractical, then the court
grants them immunity. Compensation is impractical when the decision creates
significant loss of morale by irreparable interference with the complaining own-
ers' personhood systems, usually by intruding into their territory or domestic
lives.
The private law rules of judicial review have worked fairly well. They
would work better if resort to them were more explicit. Courts, associations, and
drafters need to establish more, and more formal, compensation arrangements.
At this time, the only formal compensation arrangements widely institutional-
ized are association buyouts and rights of first refusal. Additional formal recog-
nition of the compensation principle, together with institutionalized mechanisms
for realizing that principle, would enable parties to attain the compensation
ideal ex ante rather than ex post and would reduce the litigation burden that
has debilitated so many associations and unit owners.
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